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1 Introduction
The labor market, especially the field of unemployment, is is an area of special interest
of social policy in Austria. Analyzing the expenditures which flew into unemployment,
unemployment does not seem to be a very big topic. The budget allocated to unem-
ployment only accounted to 4.7 percent in 1990 and similarly 5.8 percent in 20051.2 In
the public eye and due to media coverage, anything related to unemployment is per-
ceived to be an important social issue. The majority of the population, the labor force,
is exposed to the risk of unemployment. The share of accounted labor force was 71.3
percent in 2004, 72.4 percent in 2005 and 73.7 percent in 2006 according to the labor
force concept.3 In politics the issue of unemployment is a popular focus of election
campaigns, as it is an easy target to emotionalize the voter. The negative effects of
unemployment have been widely analyzed. Not only psychological and social aspects
like resignation, despair and being viewed as lazy or incompetent4 play an important
role. But also economic consequences such as loss of income and consumption, recurrent
unemployment, lower re-employment wages and destruction of human capital inflict the
society. Dynarski and Sheffrin (1987) found that “unemployment is associated with sig-
nificant decreases in consumption.”5 Experiencing unemployment leads to a decrease
in domestic food expenditure, which is used as a proxy for permanent consumption. It
reduces expenditures by about 8 Dollars per week for white collar workers and by about
2 Dollar per week for blue collar workers. The difference between blue and white collar
workers stems from the tendency of white collar workers to have less, but longer unem-
ployment spells. On top of that, even insecurity about one’s job decreases consumption,
no matter whether it is felt subjectively or measured objectively using individual and
job characteristics.6
Current labor income is cut off by unemployment spells, but also re-employment wages
1Statistik Austria (2008), p. 219.
2See Figure A.1 and Table B.1 in the appendix for more details on social expenditures.
3Statistik Austria (2008), p. 199.
4cf. Jahoda, Lazarsfeld, and Zeisel (2004); Warr (1987).
5Dynarski and Sheffrin (1987), p. 123.
6cf. Benito (2006).
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are negatively correlated with unemployment. Using data on British men over the pe-
riod from 1991-1997, Arulampalam (2001) estimated a wage penalty of about 5.7% in
the first re-employed year, which increases to about 13.5% in the following three years.
The penalty is largest for the first employment interruption, 21.5%, but subsequent
experience of unemployment also contributes a penalty. This can be explained by a
couple of reasons, including employers using information of foregone unemployment as
an indicator for the employees productivity. To some extent this is right, since unem-
ployment causes losses in general human capital, as well as, in industry, occupation and
firm specific human capital.
Böheim and Taylor (2002) investigated whether unemployed individuals find stable and
sustained jobs by using an independent competing risk framework. Their empirical
findings suggest that “individuals who enter a job from unemployment are [...] more
likely to (re)enter unemployment than those entering from another job”7, but this effect
is declining with respect to the unemployment duration. Better job matches of those,
who have longer unemployment spells and a longer searching duration, might explain
this effect.
A further negative consequence of unemployment is poverty. 34 percent of unemployed
people are at-risk-of-poverty8. 14 percent of short-term unemployed people (less than
6 months) are considered to be at-risk-of-poverty, compared to 51 percent of long-term
unemployed people (more than 12 months) are at-risk-of-poverty. Long-term unem-
ployed people without the social transfers have an even higher risk of 81 percent. A
large fraction of unemployed people is affected by poverty and the poverty gap9 for this
risk group is relatively large with 23 percent for short-term and 28 percent for long-term
unemployed.10
None of the above described consequences of unemployment are favorable for a society.
One could further investigate whether different population subgroups are more prone to
those consequences or whether a particular subgroup, due to an increased probability
of becoming unemployed, has to face them disproportionately.
There are “disadvantages” to enter the labor market for women because of domestic
responsibilities and childbearing. Hotchkiss (2006) found significantly negative effects
7Böheim and Taylor (2002), p. 733.
8People whose equivalized household income is below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold, which is 60
percent of the median income are at risk of poverty.
9The poverty gap is defined as the average deviation of the risk groups median equalised income from
the at-risk-of-poverty threshold in percent of the threshold. Thus it is a measure of the intensity of
poverty.
10cf. Statistik Austria (2007)a.
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of the number of children and being married on women’s probability to enter the labor
force. But after the women’s decision to enter the labor market there is clear evidence
that women are discriminated at the active side or employment side of the labor market.
There exists a large amount of literature concerning sex-wage differentials. Commonly
reporting discrimination against women. Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2005)
reviewed 263 articles, which empirically analyzed the sex wage gap all over the world.
The mean total wage gap in these articles accounted for about 33% and the mean un-
explained wage gap accounted for about 20%. The unexplained wage gap is commonly
interpreted as being the result of discrimination. This view has been criticized, because
at least parts of the unexplained wage gap can be accounted to productivity differences
observed by the employer but not by the researcher. From the 1960s to the 1990s the
mean total wage gap decreased significantly from about 65% to about 30% (0.8% per
year), whereas the mean unexplained wage gap only declined from 23% to 19%. Hence
the narrowing of the wage gap is almost entirely due to the better endowments of women
over time. A similar picture is drawn for the Austrian labor market by Böheim, Hofer,
and Zulehner (2007). They found that the mean wage gap accounted for 23.3% in 1997
and 25.5% in 1983. 61% (67%) of this gap were unexplained in 1997 (1983), when using
the male wage as reference.
As already mentioned, one part of women’s discrimination arises from occupational
(e.g. only 30 percent of Austrian managers are female11) and industrial segregation.
With respect to the latter, construction and transportation are usually male dominated
whereas education, health and social services, and hotels and restaurants are mainly
female dominated. The observed segregation can be partly explained by self-selection,
but especially the phenomenon of such a small percentage of female managers seems to
be the result of a glass ceiling effect. A glass ceiling is an “unseen, yet unbreachable
barrier that keeps minorities and women from rising to the upper rungs of the corpo-
rate ladder, regardless of their qualifications or achievements”12. Weichselbaumer (2004)
found that occupational segregation is partly the result of discrimination.
The purpose of this work is to investigate whether there is also evidence for discrimina-
tion on the passive or the unemployment side of the labor market. In more detail the
aim is to investigate whether men and women face different probabilities of being un-
employed after controlling for individual and job characteristics and therefore whether
11cf. European Commission (2007).
12Federal Glass Ceiling Commission (1995), p. 4.
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women are more likely to be affected by the consequences of unemployment. A higher
probability for women being unemployed can then result differences in labor income as
well.
Azmat, Guell, and Manning (2006) analyzed several OECD countries (including Aus-
tria) with respect to the corresponding sex gaps in unemployment rates. The authors
estimated the probability of being unemployed for each country using a probit model
and they found a significantly positive effect of being female. The effect in magnitude
is about 0.5 percentage points, after controlling for age, education, martial status and
number of children. The study neglected to control for industry and occupation effect,
nor occupational position. Since there is a strong segregation in industries, as well as
occupations, and occupational positions, and because the categories of these control
variables differ in their unemployment rates, it would be useful to control for them.
This controlling can certainly mask a glass ceiling effect, which in fact is discrimination,
but I am not primarily interested in estimating such an effect, but in estimating whether
women are facing higher probabilities given the same characteristics as men.
The rest of this study is organized in 3 chapters. The next chapter provides an overview
of theories why women could have higher probabilities or higher unemployment rates
compared to men and gives information on unemployment in Austria. The thirds chap-
ter introduces the data source for the estimations, the Austrian Labor Force Survey.
The estimation techniques, linear probability model, probit model and logit model, are
presented in the same chapter. My goal is to estimate the effect of being female on the
unemployment risk given the same characteristics as a male correspondent. In order
to check wether the estimated models hold for both, men and women, I run a Chow
Breakpoint test and add interaction terms to the regression. Both the Breakpoint test
and the interaction terms indicate different models for men and women. Therefore I
also estimate sex separated regressions. As the last point of the empirical analysis I de-
compose the female-male-risk-differential into an explained and an unexplained part. In
contrast to the regressions this method allows a different distribution of characteristics
for men and women and decomposes the risk-differential in differences due to charac-
teristics and differences due to different risk returns for men and women. Finally in the
last chapter I draw my conclusion from the findings in chapter 3.
4
2 Theoretical Background
This chapter provides an overview of theories aiming to explain why women might have
higher probabilities of being unemployed than men. In addition a detailed description
of unemployment in Austria is given. It gives a brief introduction to demand and
supply sided theories about sex differentials in unemployment and discusses the different
concepts of unemployment used in Austria, as well as, the Austrian labor market policy.
2.1 Literature Review
There is a large amount of literature on the gender wage gap and the gap in employ-
ment. Although it is evident, that the female-male unemployment differential is quiet
large in many countries1, little research is dedicated to the sex related differences in the
unemployment probability (unemployment rates respectively). Few theories attempt
to explain the observed sex differences. Those theories can be categorized into 5 dif-
ferent approaches: supply sided approaches, demand sided approaches, institutional
approaches, discrimination approaches and methodological approaches. These five cat-
egories are not exclusive. The impact of labor market institutions, for example, covers
both the demand and the supply side, since institutions influence labor supply, as well
as, labor demand. Discrimination usually occurs on the demand side. One can think
of discrimination by female or male employees against counter-sexual employers job of-
fers, or refusals related to the sex distribution within a specific firm. The literature
regarding supply sided discrimination is quite scarce and therefore not discussed here.
Methodological approaches are strongly related to supply sided arguments. Even sup-
ply and demand sided approaches are not clearly cut. In general, many arguments are
interchangeable between supply and demand sided approaches.
The main supply side argument is that the labor supply of women, especially the elas-
ticity of labor supply, differs from the men’s labor supply. Niemi (1974), analyzing U.S
data mainly of the 1960s, argues that women are more immobile regarding intra-labor
1cf. Azmat, Guell, and Manning (2006).
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force flows, i.e. geographical, occupational or industrial moves, than men. This is caused
by the shorter working life of women. Geographical or occupational moves are costly
and the rational decision maker does move if, and only if, the expected gain of the move
is at least as high as its costs. The duration of female labor market participation is
not only shorter, but also more often interrupted than the male participation. Thus
the gain period of a move for women is shorter, leading to less mobility among women
compared to men. This higher immobility cuts down job opportunities of women by
lowering their flexibility to react to regional or occupational labor market conditions.
Therefore unemployment among women increases . On the contrary, women have a
higher inter-labor force2 mobility, which leads to frictional unemployment for women.
For intra-labor force flows there is a possibility to switch directly from one job into
another without any spell of unemployment. But a period of job searching is typical
for inter-labor force flows. Since women tend to have more frequent inter-flows than
men, there is more frictional unemployment with respect to these flows among women.
A more recent Study by Hakim (1996) found that the argument of the higher occupa-
tional mobility of men does not hold in Great Britain in the 1970s. But Hakim confirms
Niemis results concerning the more frequent inter-flows of women.
These higher labor market entry and exit rates are partly the results of women’s higher
labor supply elasticity. The higher elasticity of labor supply leads to stronger reactions
of the female labor supply to labor market related changes. For instance, the prospect
of landing a high-paying job, has a bigger influence on the labor market entry deci-
sion of women as it has on the men’s decision. Or in the other direction, decreasing
wages increase the exit rates of women, while it has little effect on the exit rates of
men. This is the link to methodological arguments. By applying different techniques
and methodologies to distinguish employed, unemployed and economically inactive peo-
ple, i.e. by applying different concepts of unemployment, the female unemployment
rate changes. The labor force concept3, for example, considers home-makers - usually
women - to be out-of-labor force, if they are not searching for a job, whereas they are
classified as unemployed, if they are looking for work. Again assuming that wages in-
crease, then women, due to their higher elasticity of labor supply, suddenly start looking
for a job, which changes their classification from economically inactive to unemployed
and the female unemployment starts to increase. But not only willingness of women
to accept a job changes, also does labor demand. Due to the increase in wages, labor
2Flows between out-of-labor force and in-labor force.
3Cf. Section 2.2.1.
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demand decreases and it becomes harder to find a vacancy. Consequently, these now
job seekers will not find a job and will stay unemployed. Applying a benefits orientated
concept of unemployment in this situation may increase the overall unemployment rate
because of the declining labor demand, but does not affect women and men differently.4
Johnson (1983) suggested to adjust the definition and methodology of calculating un-
employment rates. She considered the predominantly female - especially married female
- home-maker to be a market occupation. In other words, she considered home-makers
to be employed. Johnston used the US Current Population survey, which applies the
labor force concept. She found that while from 1968 to 1979 the actual female unem-
ployment rate was above the male rate, when looking at the revised rate, which classifies
home-work as employment, the opposite is true. In 1975 the actual female rate was 8.0
percent, compared to the male rate which was 6.7 percent, but the revised female rate of
4.3 percent was even below the male rate. In 1979 the revised female rate of 3.1 percent
was again below the actual female rate (5.7 percent) and the male rate (4.1 percent).
The arguments on the demand side are strongly related to labor market institutions,
especially in Europe. But let’s start by an economy that lacks to absorb new entrants.
This was investigated by Myatt and Murrell (1990). They investigated the effect of
bottlenecks in the capacity of an economy to take in new labor market entrants on the
Canadian male/female unemployment rate differential. If the initial labor force of any
country is almost purely male and the economy has a lack of ability to absorb new
entrants - women5 -, that new group will have a higher unemployment rate, even if it
has the same skills and preferences as the initial group. This is simply because the
new entrants automatically are unemployed. Suppose an economy with 10 male and 1
female workers and 100 male and 100 female economically inactive people. Assuming
that both, men and women, increase their labor force participation by 1 percentage
point, then the new economy consists of 11 male and 2 female workers. Since the econ-
omy can not absorb any new entrant6, both entrants are unemployed. Hence the male
unemployment rate is 10 percent, but female rate is 50 percent. While Myatt’s and
Murrell’s (1990) empirical results suggest that the bottleneck effect can only explain a
small part of the differential, they found that it is highly affected by minimum wages.
Minimum wages contributed 3 percent on average to the unemployment rate differential.
4As long as we assume a wage increase that is not limited to certain industries or occupation, which
may be correlated with sex and therefore affects men and women in different ways.
5Most of the male working age part of the population is already employed.
6A temporary 0-labor demand and labor contracts fixing the wages for a certain time are assumed,
such that adjustments of labor prices, labor supply and labor demand can be neglected.
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And further, “if it were not the impact of minimum wages mature females would have
had an unemployment rate 1.5 percentage point below that of men.”7 Similar conclu-
sion were drawn by Acemoglu (2002), who analyzed why wage inequality in the U.S.
increased over the 1980s, whereas in Europe there was almost no change. He developed
a simple model to explain this different behavior by differences in the relative demand
for skills. He concluded that, due to the minimum wage laws in Europe, technological
shocks raising investment costs of firms increase the unemployment of unskilled work-
ers, as long as, firms open separate vacancies for skilled and unskilled jobs. Assuming
that a new technology can be adapted with skilled workers without training them, but
the adoption with low skilled worker is associated with training costs, then adopting
the new technology with the low skilled worker would decrease her marginal product,
i.e. her wage. Due to minimum wage laws, the wage of many low skilled workers is
prevented to decrease and thus the new technology is adopted with the high skilled
worker only. This of course leads to higher unemployment among low skilled workers.
Assuming women being more unskilled compared to men, technological shocks increas-
ing the unemployment rate of unskilled workers relative to skilled workers, indirectly
raise the female rate to a higher extent. Bertola, Blau and Kahn (2002) researched
the impact of collective bargaining and coordination of wage-setting on different age
and sex groups using data of 17 OECD countries from 1960 to 1996. Their theoretical
model suggested that the impact of these labor market institutions on the labor market
outcome is different for groups with different labor supply elasticities and different la-
bor demand elasticities. “Unions-or, more generally, policies and institutions aimed at
improving workers’ welfare - raise the relative pay (and lower the relative employment)
of groups with more elastic labour supply schedules.”8 These groups are younger and
elderly people, as well as, women. In contrast to market insiders9, these outsider groups
are more likely to make decisions between employment and school, employment and
retirement, and home production and market work. A less elastic labor demand leads
to a higher wage mark up - bargained by unions - and to a lower union employment
relative to non-union employment. The more wage-setting is centralized and the greater
the unions coverage, the greater the impact on (un-)employment is. The extreme case
of a totally unionized economy with a centralized bargaining process yields a relatively
high wage compression and a relatively lower employment for groups with less inelastic
labor supply. Due to the fact that almost all jobs are covered by the union, individuals,
7Myatt and Murrell (1990), p. 318.
8Bertola, Blau, and Kahn (2002), p. 9.
9Prime age men.
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who lose their jobs will not be able to find a non-union alternative. Thus in such an
environment the model predicts higher unemployment for outsiders. While the authors
did not find a significant impact of union wage-setting institutions on the male-female
employment differentials,a significant effect on the male-female unemployment differen-
tial was found. The impact of union wage-setting institutions lower the unemployment
rate of men by 4.4 to 6.2 percentage points relative to the female rate. “The results
are consistent with women being drawn into labour force by the prospect of landing a
high-paying union job in countries where strong wage centralization tends to price them
out of work.”10
A well known fact is that additional education lowers unemployment. Mincer found,
that “unemployment gets smaller as the level of education in the group increases.”11
According to the human capital theory one makes decisions about human capital in-
vestments, especially educational investment, with respect to future income streams. If
the marginal cost of a one unit increase in schooling exceeds the marginal gain in future
income, a rational individual will choose to work over education. Vice versa if the gain
of schooling exceeds the expected income gain, then the rational individual will choose
additional education over working. Clearly, the present value of future income depends
on the duration of active work cycles. The work duration of women is usually shorter
than that of males due to baby pauses and household responsibilities. This again leads
to a lower expected income and less investment in human capital, consequently to higher
unemployment. Little evidence shows that females investment into formal education is
that for their male counterparts, but firms invest more into male on-the-job training.
The reason can be found in the shorter and more interrupted work life of women. Firms
expect the gain period of investing in men to be longer than the female gain period. The
more specific the training is, the less women are likely to attend this training. If women
receive less on-the-job trainings, the unemployment rate of women should be more cycli-
cal than the mens rate, because due to the investment firing a man is associated with
higher costs. Women could anticipate this behavior of firms and concentrate in cyclical
and seasonal insensitive industries and occupations such as education, finance and pub-
lic administration. And that is where we usually find women, especially in education.
So far all of these theories suggested that it is some kind of decision made by women
themselves or other economic forces that cause sex differentials in unemployment. The
following considerations will turn to discrimination. There are different ways through
10Bertola, Blau, and Kahn (2002), p. 29.
11Mincer (1991), p. 4.
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which discrimination can be channeled. An employer can discriminate by taste and
refuse to hire women or tend to fire women who have already been employed in this
firm. This is consistent with Beckers (1975) taste-based discrimination, which assumes
that discrimination is some distaste of the employer. Discriminatory actions in this
frame work must be related to costs such as the employees productivity traits. In the
unemployment context this means firing and hiring must be associated with costs cov-
ered by the employer, and this in fact is true. For example, a firm’s searching time
for an adequate employee may take longer, if the firm refuses to hire women. Another
way of discrimination is statistical discrimination (Phelps [1972] and Arrow [1973]).
From the employer’s perspective, hiring an employee is a situation of imperfect infor-
mation. Many productivity related characteristics are unknown to the employer, thus
the hiring decision is based on expectations about the groups average characteristics.
Weichselbaumer (2004) conducted a field experiment in Austria to investigate whether
sex discrimination in the hiring process for typically male (network-technician and com-
puter programmer) and female occupations (accountant and secretary) has its sources
in statistical discrimination or in taste-based discrimination. Job applications were sent
out by a fictive man signalizing typically male attributes and personality characteristics,
by a fictive woman signalizing typically female attributes and personality characteristics
and by a second fictive women with male personality attributes. Even after controlling
for personality, Weichselbaumer found discrimination in the hiring process in favor of
men when the occupation is typically male and in favor of women when the occupation
is typically female.
2.2 Unemployment in Austria
“Unemployment is a clear theoretical concept, but it cannot be translated easily into
a measurable concept.”12 The main question that arises is when to call somebody
unemployed. Can a person be unemployed, even if she works but on a non-regular basis?
What about part-time workers preferring a full-time job, but not getting one? They are
indeed rationed at the labor market, but are they unemployed? The distinction between
out-of-labor force and being economically active is not that clear, since this decision can
depend on labor market conditions or the employment status of a person respectively.
Are discouraged workers13 unemployed or out-of-labor force?
12Rosner (2003), p. 201.
13A working age person who gives up looking for work because of no success
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The first part of this section overviews which concepts of unemployment are used in
Austria. The purpose is to highlight some of their advantages, drawbacks and to describe
the resulting unemployment rates arising from these concepts. The second part describes
the entitlement to benefits, labor market policy and institutions in Austria.
2.2.1 The Unemployment Rate
The simplest unemployment measure is the rate of unemployment (u). It is defined as
the ratio of unemployed people (U) to labor force (L)
u =
U
L
and therefore depends on who is counted in each group. Thus, one has to be careful
in interpreting and comparing unemployment by accounting for differences in counting
methods.
In Austria there are three main definitions of unemployment, which differ in their ways
of dividing the population into the groups employed, unemployed and economically in-
active. The first one follows the national definition and is calculated and published
by the Public Employment Service (PES). This concept is usually referred to as the
national statistic.The other two concepts are calculated and provided by the Statistics
Austria. Statistics Austria uses the labor force concept (LFC) of the International Labor
Organization (ILO) and the subsistence concept (Lebensunterhaltskonzept (LUK)).
National definition. According to the national definition the unemployment rate is
the ratio of unemployed, who are registered at the PES, to labor force, which is the
sum of unemployed people and all compulsorily social insured employment relation-
ships registered at the Main Association of Austrian Social Security Institutions (HV -
Hauptverband).
A few aspects need to be mentioned here. The first aspect is that unemployed people,
who participate in a training scheme, and people who receive advance pension payments
are neither counted in the nominator nor in the denominator. Secondly, the data con-
cerning non self-employed people, coming from the Main Association of Austrian Social
Security Institutions, refers to employment relationships and not to employed people,
which means that somebody holding two or more jobs is counted twice or more often.
Thirdly, on the one hand not all of the registered unemployed people are looking for
11
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work (mainly seasonal workers and people who have already found a new job with-
out starting it yet) and on the other hand there are job seeking people, who are not
registered (mostly because they are not entitled to claim unemployment benefits, e.g.
people entering the labor market for the first time or women re-entering after a long
break). Finally, unemployed people who are registered at the PES, are allowed to work
a minimal amount if their earnings do not exceed a specific threshold (monthly EUR
341.16 in 2007) without losing entitlement.
uPES =
unemployed registered at PES
unemployed at registered PES + employment relationships registered at HV
Subsistence Concept. People assign themselves into one of the following groups:
employed, conscripts or on community service, parental leave, unemployed, pensioners,
permanently disabled, housekeeping, in education, and others. Here, ‘conscripts or
on community service’ and ‘parental leave’ are counted as employed and ‘all others’
except for ‘unemployed’ are considered to be out of labor force. The calculation of the
unemployment rate is based upon data from the Austrian Labor Force Survey (LFS) or
from the micro census, respectively.
Similar to the national definition, individuals can work up to 12 hours per week without
being counted as employed. Since respondents assign themselves to these groups, a clear
distinction may be problematic. The group ‘pensioners’ for instance, contains people
whose main subsistence is capital income, even though they might work more than 12
hours a week as an employee, or a part time working student, who assigning herself as
a student.
In 2003 the subsistence concept lost its importance due to the implementation of the
continuously LFS in the micro census, but it is still reported.
uLUK =
unemployed according to LUK
unemployed according to LUK + employed according to LUK
Labor Force Concept. The calculation of the unemployment rate, according to the
labor force concept, is based upon data from the LFS. People are considered to be em-
ployed, if they worked for at least one hour in the reference week or are temporarily
absent (parental leave, holiday, illness, . . .). People are considered to be unemployed, if
they are not employed, are actively looking for work and able to take up work within
two weeks or have found work to start within the next three months.
Two main points constitute the big difference between the LFC to the LUK and es-
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pecially to the PES: Classifying individuals actively seeking for work as unemployed
(actively-seeking-work condition) and a very low threshold of one working hour per
week necessary to be classified as being employed. The actively-seeking-work condi-
tion lets re-entering women and newly entering students to be classified as unemployed,
while seasonal workers, who did not have a job in the reference week, are not necessarily
classified as unemployed. Working one hour per week might not lead to an income,
which is high enough to cover living costs. But one can argue that those individuals
are additional workers in a household with two or more members, that they receive
additional public benefits, e.g. unemployment benefit; or that further capital income
counts as their major earnings source.
uLFC =
unemployed according to LFC
unemployed according to LFC + employed according to LFC
The LFC unemployment rate is the relation of people, who do not work at all, but are
looking for work, to unemployed people in this sense plus everyone who is working only
one hour per week, even if she is an unpaid family worker . Figure A.2 in the appendix
gives a detailed overview on how people are classified according to the LFC.
Figures 2.1 to 2.3 show intra-concept sex differences in the yearly and quarterly un-
employment rates from 1995 to 2006 and from the first quarter of 2004 to the third
quarter of 200714. Looking at the yearly PES rate, figure 2.0(a), two major features
stand out. Firstly, there is an expected cyclical behaviour of unemployment: in 2000,
which is the year with the second highest growth rate of real GDP15 (about 3.4 per-
cent) in this period, the unemployment rate reaches its lowest value of about 6 percent.
Secondly, up to the year 2000 the female unemployment rate was above the male rate.
From 2000 onwards, the male rate was above the female one. Three reasonable non-
exclusive explanations are available for the reversion of the unemployment gap: Due
to the relatively good economic conditions throughout the year more women entered
the labor market from home production. Also the sharp increase in part time jobs for
women. Women persistently profit by the high GDP growth rate. The quarterly data,
figure 2.0(b), indicates a strong seasonal pattern for men, with peaks in the first quarters
mainly driven by the male dominated construction industry. In contrast, there is less
evidence for seasonality in the female unemployment rate, with smoother peaks in the
14In case of the LUK the quarterly series begins with the second quarter of 2006.
15See table B.2
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fourth quarters. The male unemployment rate decreases by about 4 percentage points
from the first to the third quarter and increases again by about 4 percentage points
from the third to the first quarter.
The yearly LUK-data, figure 2.1(a), differs. From 1995 to 2002 differences between
women and men are observable, with women having a higher rate. From 2002 onwards
the male and the female rate are almost the same. In 2003 there is a relatively large
increase in both rates of more than one percentage points. Interpreting the quarterly
data is more difficult for the LUK rates, since only six observations were available. Still
it seems that men are facing a stronger seasonal pattern than women.
In terms of dynamics the yearly unemployment rate in case of the LFC is relatively
similar to that of the PES, but it differs in the level. Excluding 2002 and 2003, the
female rate was above the male one. From 1995 to 2003 the gap seemed to narrow, but
from 2003 onwards it widened again. Looking at the quarterly data, figure 2.2(b) is
quite interesting. Although one would expect almost no seasonality, there is evidence
for it, even though much weaker than in the PES case. The most interesting feature
being the counter-male-seasonal behaviour of the female rate. In the first quarters there
is virtually no difference between the men’s and the women’s rate. But while the male
rate becomes lower in the second and third quarters, the female rate increases. In the
fourth quarters, the male rate rises again and the female rate decreases. The first quar-
ter of 2007 is the only exemption. In this quarter the two rates do not equal each other
as in the former first quarters, which seems to be the result of a relatively high decrease
of the male rate in the third quarter of 2006.
Differences. The results from above show, that the three concepts strongly differ with
regards to the total exclusiveness of the states employed and unemployed in the labor
force concept, being the sharpest cut between the definitions. In contrast, the public
administration allows an overlap of employment and unemployment because of social
security purposes. As already mentioned, an one-hour-a-week job might not generate
sufficiently large income to cover living costs. Another difference is the comparability
of countries. The LFC is designed to facilitate international comparisons and can be
applied to nearly all countries. The national concept is in fact national and depends
mainly on the unemployment insurance system of each country. Thus cross-country
comparisons suffer from the mentioned heterogeneity and partly lose their meanings as
the unemployment insurance systems diverge.
The PES calculates using “real” numbers covering almost the whole labor force, while the
14
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LFC and the LUK version use statistical projections, thus the LFC and the LUK include
some relatively small errors. In contrast to the national definition in both, the labor
force concept and the subsistence concept employees, self employed and unemployed are
summed up to the labor force. The PES only uses employees and unemployed individ-
uals. Consequently the denominator of the LFC and the LUK are bigger. The amounts
of people in the labor force according to the LFC and the LUK are quite similar to
each other. Because of the one-hour threshold and the actively-seeking-work condition,
the amount of unemployed people is the smallest under the labor force concept. The
biggest amount of unemployed people can be found using the PES. Therefore the LFC
yields the lowest and the PES the highest unemployment rate. Figure 2.4 and figure 2.5
show that the unemployment rate according to the LFC is constantly beneath the PES
rate, yearly as well as quarterly. During the whole period the yearly LUK rate for men
is between the LFC and PES rate, but approaches the PES rate from 2003 onwards.
The female LUK rate already exceeds the PES rate in 2004 and is above it in 2005 and
2006. In general, the concepts exhibit almost the same dynamics for the yearly data,
but on different levels. Due to their different sensitivity to seasonal unemployment, the
greatest differences occur in the quarterly data.
2.2.2 Labor Market Policy
Besides employment policy, which will not be discussed here, a state can use active and
passive labor market instruments to to deal with unemployment. In Austria two insti-
tutions are responsible for this: the Federal Ministry of Economics and Labor (BMWA
- Bundesministerium für Wirschaft und Arbeit) and the Public Employment Service
(PES). The legal framework of Austria’s labor market policy is stipulated by several
laws, in general by the Labor Market Promotion Act (AMFG - Arbeitsmarktförderungs-
gesetz), the Public Employment Service Act (AMSG - Arbeitsmarktservicegesetz), the
Unemployment Insurance Act (ALVG - Arbeitslosenversichungsgesetz), the Labor Mar-
ket Finance Act (AMPFG - Arbeitsmarktpolitik-Finanzierungsgesetz) and the Act Gov-
erning Employment of Foreign Nationals (AuslBG - Ausländerbeschäftigungsgesetz).
The main objective of labor market policy is to prevent and reduce unemployment and
to ensure a functioning labor market.
In 2000 the governmental areas of economics and labor were combined in one agency, the
Federal Ministry of Economics and Labor. It has a broad-ranged agenda containing eco-
nomic policy, innovation and technology, enterprise, foreign trade policy, labor market
(including labor law and Labor Inspection), energy and mining and tourism. The Labor
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Market Promotion Act forces the ministry “to use all available resources to achieve and
maintain full employment and ensure an optimally functioning labour market.”16 In
1994 the Public Employment Service Act was enacted and partly repealed and replaced
the AMFG from 1969. The major change was to devolve the labor market manage-
ment from the Federal Ministry to a new separate institution, the Public Employment
Service. Since then the ministries main tasks concerning the labor market (excluding
labor law and Labor Inspection) are defining policy goals, approving financial decisions,
supervision, evaluation and monitoring.
In 1994, under the Public Employment Service Act, the Public Employment Service
was established and took over labor market responsibilities from the Federal Ministry
of Economics and Labor. The PES is a service agency under public law dealing with
private and public-sectors matters. The active labor market policy duties are promoted
from the more private-sectors laws AMFG and AMSG. Passive duties are developed
by AMSG and are regulated by the the Unemployment Insurance Act, which regulates
the liability to unemployment insurance and qualifications for unemployment benefits
and unemployment assistance. The PES has a more decentralized organisation than the
BMWA, containing one Federal office, 9 Länder offices and 99 regional offices, which
leads to more flexibility in reacting to regional labor market issues. A close relationship
to the social partners is prominent at all levels. The two major functions of the PES
are the provision of services to job-seekers and to employers. Services for job-seekers in-
clude active and activating services such as information, counseling, guidance, training,
supervision and support and passive services in form of benefit claims. Active services
for employes are information, counseling, guidance, filling vacancies and securing em-
ployment.
2.2.2.1 Active and Activating Labor Market Policy
Active labor market policy is supposed to enhance allocative efficiency at the labor mar-
ket and to support disadvantaged people.
The BMWAs active duties are to define policy goals, supervise, evaluate and monitor-
ing to improve the quality and sustainability of measures, and to enhance labor market
transparency. Along with these general duties of the BMWA, active labor market pol-
icy focuses on four main areas of measures: 1. skill training schedules (education and
training programmes, subsistence allowance during training, allowances to cover ancil-
lary course costs), 2. employment subsidies (company integration subsidy, subsidies to
16BMWA (2005), p. 8.
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employment in socioeconomic enterprises and community projects), 3. support mea-
sures (counselling and guidance centres, childcare subsidies, business start-up schemes)
and 4. activating measures. Activating policy measures include the allowance for ben-
efits used for active purposes, but are not intended as income support benefits such
as unemployment benefit and assistance. Such measures are part-time allowance for
older workers, unemployment benefit or assistance during training, unemployment ben-
efits for rehabilitation, et cetera). Austrian active labor market policy mostly focuses
on skill training, measured by the total number of participants and measured by the
expenditures. In 2004 245,278 out of 302,300 program participants, or 81 percent of
participants, were enrolled in skill training programs. Programs promoting education
and training (141,496 individuals), subsistence allowances during training (159,954 in-
dividuals) and allowances to cover ancillary course costs (139,002 individuals) being the
most important ones. Employment subsidies which were given to 40,183 people (13 per-
cent of all participants) and support measures were received by 60,085 individuals (20
percent of all participants) play a minor role. Analyzing the total number of program
participants, the share of women is about 55 percent, but varies partly by the different
measures. The fraction of women involved in employment subsidies is about 49 percent,
in skill training about 55 percent and about 53 percent in support measures.
Table 2.1: Program participants in 2004
Total Women
Employment subsidies 40,183 19,578
Skills training 245,278 135,887
Support measures 60,085 31,727
Total 302,300 165,107
Table 2.1 presents the number of total and female
participants of active labor market programs in 2004.
Source: BMWA (2005)
2.2.2.2 Passive Labor Market Policy
Passive labor market policy includes providing income support during unemployment
spells which lies in the responsibility area of the PES. At the moment a registered un-
employed can be entitled for one of the following five payments: unemployment benefit,
unemployment assistance, advance pension payment, temporary assistance and transi-
tion benefit. The entitlement to those income supports is regulated by the ALVG.
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In order to be eligible to receive benefit one has to be registered at the PES, be able
and willing to work, which means being ready to take up a job, participate in a labor
market policy scheme or seeking work on your own, and having paid unemployment
contribution for a specific period. This period depends on whether a person has been
unemployed previously with receiving unemployment benefit during this unemployment
spell and whether a person is older than 25 years old. For those who are unemployed
for the first time and have passed the age of 26, it applies that they must have been
employed for at least 52 weeks within the last 24 month. If somebody has already
received benefits, the period nearly halves to 28 weeks of contributory employment in
the last 12 month. Individuals who have not reached the age of 25 yet, must have been
working for 26 weeks within the last 12 month.
The unemployment benefit is about 55 percent of last years net income17 with a maxi-
mum of EUR 40.14 per day. Benefits below the equalisation supplement reference rate
(EUR 726.00 in 2007 for singles) are supplemented up to the reference rate, except for
the case that the equalisation supplement reference rate exceeds 60 (80) percent of net
income of a person without (with) family supplements. Then those individuals get 60
(80) percent of their net income.
The minimum duration of unemployment benefit is 20 weeks, the maximum depends on
the weeks of contribution and age. The maximum duration for 156 weeks of contribu-
tion within the last five years is 30 weeks, 312 contributing weeks within the preceding
10 years and an age of at least 40 years yields to a maximum of 39 weeks. Finally an
unemployment spell can last for 52 weeks if a person is at least 50 years old and was
in contributory employment for 468 weeks during the past 15 years. The duration can
even be extended under certain conditions like participation in a training scheme.
If a person quits employment by herself voluntarily, she will not get any benefit for four
weeks. If a beneficiary refuses a suitable job offer or a training scheme, the benefit pay-
ment gets suspended and the benefit duration is reduced. Whether a job is suitable or
not depends on the length of unemployment already experienced. Within the first 100
days a job is suitable if placement in jobs, other than the previously held, is considered
as unreasonable. The placement is considered as unreasonable “if such placement makes
it much more difficult for the job-seeker to find in the future a job in his/her previous
occupation.”18 After 120 days a job is already suitable, if it is in another field of work
and if it is part-time, where a part-time job is reasonable if the contributory pay is at
17net income = gross income - social security contribution - income tax
18BMWA (2007)b, p. 2.
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least 75 percent of the last pay used for calculating the benefit.
One can apply for unemployment assistance, after the entitlement for unemployment
benefits is expired, but the eligibility requirements are much stricter than for the ben-
efit. Additionally to the necessary conditions of ability and willingness to work, the
affectedness of unemployment, a person must be financially distressed. The criterion of
financial distress does not only depend on her income (rental income, orphan’s pension),
but also on the income of the spouse or cohabitant living in the same household.
The amount of unemployment assistance depends on the economically situation of the
household and on the duration for which an unemployed person received unemployment
benefit. It accounts for up to 95 percent of unemployment benefit, if it does not exceed
the equalisation supplement reference rate and 92 percent, otherwise. For individuals,
who received unemployment benefits for 20 weeks the maximum monthly amount is
equal to the equalisation supplement reference rate. For those with a benefit duration
of 30 weeks the maximum monthly amount is equal to the subsistence level (EUR 847.00
in 2007). The unemployment assistance is not limited to a certain duration, but the
claim has to be renewed every 52 weeks of receipt.
In contrast to unemployment benefits, one must take up an offered job, even if it is
not equal or related to the former field of work or does not fit the qualification of the
beneficiary.
Table 2.2: Recipients of unemployment benefit and assistance
Year
Unemployment benefit Unemployment assistance
Men Women Total Men Women Total
2000 63,987 43,969 107,956 40,002 34,925 74,927
2001 70,952 46,899 117,851 39,154 32,540 71,694
2002 80,039 52,637 132,676 47,852 34,998 82,850
2003 77,367 50,856 128,223 53,198 36,903 90,101
2004 75,011 50,712 125,723 55,950 39,050 95,000
2005 76,563 52,839 129,402 57,082 39,430 96,512
2006 71,264 49,705 120,969 54,503 37,404 91,907
Table 2.2 presents annual averages of unemployment benefit and
assistance recipients by gender and in total.
Source: Statistics Austria (2008)
Table 2.2 gives an overview of unemployment benefit and assistance recipients by sex.
In most years, we observe less women receiving unemployment benefit and unemploy-
ment assistance. The differences between the total number of female recipients and
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the total number of male recipients is greater for the unemployment benefit recipients.
Relative to all recipients the female fraction of unemployment benefit recipients is about
41 percent (2006) and about 40 percent (2006) of all unemployment assistance recipi-
ents were female. The fraction of women receiving unemployment benefit is relatively
stable through out the years, ranging from about 40 to about 41 percent. The picture is
different for unemployment assistance. In 2000 about 47 percent of the recipients were
women, which almost steadily decreased to about 41 percent.
Applicants to pension, old-age or disability, can claim advance pension payment, during
the applications process. Everyone who is entitled either for unemployment benefits
or for assistance is eligible for such payment. The criteria of ability and willingness to
work and availability must not be fulfilled. The amount is equal to the unemployment
benefits and assistance, but reaches its maximum at the mean of the applied pension.
The transition benefit was designed during the pension reform in 2004, which enhanced
the statutory early retirement age. Unemployed people who would have reached the pre-
reform early retirement age in the years 2004 to 2009 are entitled to transition benefits.
Temporary assistance is provided to civil servants, who were not covered by a compul-
sory unemployment insurance, but are not eligible for “Ruhe- oder Versorgungsgenuß”
and fulfill all other criteria.
2.2.2.3 Expenditure on Labor Market Policy
In 2006, active and activating labor market policy expenditure accounted for 1,788 Mio.
EUR, which was the highest value until 2006 and an increase of 15 percent compared to
2005. This enormous growth is mainly due to the increase in the active and activating
PES fund, needed for the governmental initiative "Unternehmen Arbeitsplatz". Table
2.3 gives the expenditure on active, activating and passive labor market policy expendi-
ture without employer-related labor market support for 2001 to 2007. Expenditure for
passive labor market policy accounted for EUR 2,868 Mio. in 2006, mainly unemploy-
ment benefit and unemployment assistance accounting for about three-fourths of total
passive expenditure.
Table 2.3: Labor market policy expenditure PES/BMWA in Mio. EUR
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
active labor market policy
PES 626 628 700 711 712 847 846
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Table 2.3: continued
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
BMWA 42 38 66 82 73 80 61
Subtotal active LMP 667 666 767 793 785 927 907
activating labor market policy
PES 243 400 629 747 770 860 790
BMWA-IAFa - - 85 120 125 132 139
Sum active and activating LMP 910 1,066 1,481 1,660 1,680 1,920 1,836
passive labor market policy
Unemployment benefit 1,016 1,192 1,226 1,225 1,274 1,267 1,193
Unemployment assistance 533 624 723 779 806 813 761
Sum passive LMP 2,683 2,434 2,516 2,599 2,813 2,868 2,759
Source: BMWA
a Apprenticeship training bonus
2.2.3 International Comparison
Figure 2.6 shows that Austria among the countries with the lowest unemployment rates
according to the labor force concept within the European Union and the OECD. Within
Europe, Austria has got the sixth lowest rate in 2006, only Norway, the Netherlands,
Cyprus, Ireland and Denmark had even lower rates. When analyzing the expenditures
on active and activating labor market policy Austria is in the mid-range of all OECD
countries. Active and activating LMP accounted for 0.62 percent of GDP according to
EU and OECD definition in 2005, which is very close to the unweighted OECD average
of 0.61 percent. Normalised to 1 percent of the unemployment rate gives 0.12 percent
and improves Austria’s position to the upper mid-range of the OECD countries.
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Figure 2.6: International unemployment rates - EUROSTAT 2006
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3 Empirical Analysis
This chapter provides an overview of the data source for the estimations and the meth-
ods. It presents and discusses the estimation results, as well as, further analyses.
3.1 Models1
The proposed method is to use a limited dependent variable model, where the response
is binary coded. A limited dependent variable (LDV) is a dependent variable whose
values are restricted in some way, in the present case it is restricted to the values zero
and one. Not every LDV needs special treatment. For example hourly wage, is re-
stricted to be positive, but since it can take many different values, it can be treated
as approximately continuous. For binary dependent variables there are three models
available - the linear probability model, the probit model and the logit model. In order
to check the robustness of the outcomes, each of these models will be estimated. The
specification of these models, their advantages and caveats will be discussed below.
3.1.1 Linear Probability Model
The linear probability model describes the probability of success - the binary dependent
variable taking the value one - as linear function of the explanatory variables. The
multiple regression model is
yi = β0 + β1xi1 + ...+ βkxik + ui ∀ i = 1 . . . , n (3.1)
For simplicity, I will continue dropping the index i of the observations and use xβ instead
of β0 + β1xi1 + ...+ βkxik, where x is a 1× k-vector and β is a k × 1-vector.
1cf. Wooldridge (2006).
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Assuming that E(u|x) = 02, leads to the following expression
E(y|x) = xβ (3.2)
Since it is always true that P (y = 1|x) = E(y|x)3, one can write
P (y = 1|x) = xβ, (3.3)
where P (y = 1|x) is the probability of success or the response probability.
Since P (y = 1|x) is a linear function, also P (y = 0) = 1−P (y = 1|x) is a linear function
of the xj (j = 1, . . . , k).
What about the error term? We already know that P (y = 1|x) = xβ. So if y = 1,
rearranging y = xβ + u and inserting y = 1 then yields
u = 1− xβ = 1− P (y = 1).
Thus the error term can take two values, it can take the value 1−xβ with a probability
of xβ or it can take the value −xβ4 with a probability of 1− xβ. The expectation and
variance of a discrete random variable are defined as
E(X) =
n∑
i=1
xipi
V ar(X) =
n∑
i=1
x2i pi − E(X)2
where pi is the probability of the event xi. Thus
E(u|x) = (1− xβ)xβ + (−xβ)(1− xβ) = 0 (3.4)
2See equation (3.4) for a proof.
3E(y|x) = 1 · P (y = 1) + 0 · P (y = 0) = P (y = 1)
4Inserting y = 0 instead of y = 1.
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and
V ar(u|x) = (1− xβ)2xβ + (−xβ)2(1− xβ)
= xβ − 2(xβ)2 + (xβ)3 + (−xβ)2 +−xβ3
= xβ − (xβ)2
= xβ(1− xβ) (3.5)
Equation (3.5) shows that the variance of the errors depends on x. Which does not
bias the OLS estimates, but the usual t- and F statistics are invalid - one should use
heteroskedasticity robust errors for statistical inference.
I use the heteroskedasticity-robust variance matrix estimator of βˆ introduced by White
(1980)
Vˆ = (X ′X)−1
(
n∑
i=1
uˆ2ix
′
ixi
)
(X ′X)−1. (3.6)
The greatest advantage of the LPM is that one can apply OLS, which is a quiet easy
procedure. After applying OLS the estimated parameter βj measures the change in the
response probability, when xj changes cet.par.
∆P (y = 1) = βj∆xj (3.7)
For example assume
yˆ = 0.5 + 0.1x1 − 0.2x2 (3.8)
then βˆ1 = 0.1 must be interpreted as: holding everything else constant in (3.8), a one
unit increase in x1, increases the response probability by 0.1. If say x1 is a dummy
variable, the interpretation is similar, holding everything else constant, the group of
interest has a 0.1 percentage points higher probability of success than the base group.
Now assume that for any given observation x1 = 1 and x2 = 4, then the predicted
probability is -0.2, or x1 = 7 an x2 = 1, which yields a predicted probability of 1.1.
This is one of the drawbacks of the LPM, it can lead to probabilities larger than one
and smaller than zero. Then the results are not interpretable as probabilites.
Anther problem is that “a probability cannot be linearly related to the independent
variables for all their possible values.”5 But nevertheless it usually works well near the
sample means of the explanatory variables.
5Wooldridge (2006), p. 255.
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3.1.2 Binary Choice Models: Probit and Logit
Probit and logit models overcome the drawbacks of probabilities outside the unit interval
and the constant partial effect of any independent variable of the LPM. Both models
can be motivated by an underlying latent variable model.
Assume
y∗ = β0 + xβ +  (3.9)
where y∗ is a unobserved latent variable. The observed variable y equals one if y∗ > 0
and zero otherwise.
y = 1, if y∗ > 0
y = 0, if y∗ ≤ 0
 is assumed either to have a standard normal distribution or the standard logistic
distribution and thus is symmetrical distributed around zero, meaning that 1−G(−z) =
G(z) for all z ∈ R. The response probability for y is then
P (y = 1|x) = P (y∗ > 0|x)
= P [ > −(β0 + xβ)|x]
= 1−G[−(β0 + xβ)] = G(β0 + xβ)
where G(β0 + xβ) = G(z)
G :R→ (0, 1)
z 7→ G(z)
In most applications G is either the standard normal cumulative distribution, leading
to the probit model (see equation (3.10)), or the the logistic function, leading to the
logit model (see equation (3.12)).
G(z) = Φ(z) =
∫ z
−∞
φ(ν)dν (3.10)
where φ(z) is the standard normal density
φ(z) =
1√
2pi
exp
(−z2
2
)
(3.11)
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G(z) =
exp (z)
[1 + exp (z)]
(3.12)
The advantage to restrict the estimated probabilities to (0,1) is not costless. Because
of the non-linear nature of G, it is not as easy to calculate the partial effect of xj as in
the case of the LPM.
If xj is approximately continuous, then the partial effect of xj on P (y = 1|x) = p(x)
can be derived, as in the case of the LPM, by calculating the partial derivative
∂p(x)
∂xj
=
dG
dz
(z) = g6(β0 + xβ)βj (3.13)
G is strictly increasing in both the probit and logit case and thus g(β0 +xβ) > 0 for all
β0 + xβ. Therefore the sign of the partial effect of xj only depends on the sign of βj.
The partial effect of a binary explanatory variable xj is simply the difference, when
changing xj form one to zero cet.par.
G(β0 + β1x1 + . . .+ βj + . . .+ βkxk)
−G(β0 + β1x1 + . . .+ βj−1xj−1 + βj+1xj+1 + . . .+ βkxk)
(3.14)
A quiet similar difference method can be used for any other discrete variable xj
G(β0 + β1x1 + . . .+ βj(xj + 1) + . . .+ βkxk)
−G(β0 + β1x1 + . . .+ βjxj + . . .+ βkxk)
(3.15)
Equation (3.13 to 3.14) show, that the partial effect of xj depends on all other ex-
planatory variables. So to estimate the magnitude of the partial effect, one must plug
in certain values for all xj and evaluate it at those values. The partial effects often
are evaluated at the means, medians, maxima, minima, et cetera of the explanatory
variables. An alternative way is to take the mean of the partial effect calculated for
every observation, which is sometimes called the average partial effect in contrast to the
partial effect at the average.
Since G is a non-linear function, OLS is not applicable. Although one could use non-
linear least squares, it is more convenient to use maximum likelihood estimation7. “Be-
cause maximum likelihood estimation is based on the distribution of y given x, the
6Note that g is a probability density function, because G is cumulative distribution function.
7For a discussion of maximum likelihood estimation see for example Wooldridge, J.M., Econometric
Analysis of Cross Section and Panal Data. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
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heteroskedasticity in V ar(y|x) is automatically accounted for.”8
3.2 Data
The data consists of four subsamples of the Austrian micro census of 2004, 2005, 2006
and 2007 containing only respondents who were in the survey for the first time. This has
three advantages: first, I do not have to worry about individuals who were interviewed
more than once, second, I do not have to choose a particular interview and third, peo-
ple tend to give the same answers as in previous interviews when they are asked more
than once. Using only data on first interviews eliminates the difficulties resulting from
repeated interviews.
3.2.1 Labor Force Survey
From 19959 until 2003 the Labor Force Survey, which is a standard questionnaire of
the European Union and serves as a base for establishing an international comparable
data on employment and unemployment, was conducted yearly as a march supplement
of the micro census by Statistics Austria. In 2004 the concept changed to a continuous
survey. Since 2004 the LFS is not restricted to one month (March), but is conducted
referring to reference weeks through out a whole year, which mainly increases the ability
to capture seasonal fluctuation. Since the presented data ranges from 2004 to 2007, it
does not cover this structural break.
The LFS contains a lot of questions about the employment status of a respondent, the
industry and occupation she belongs to, her occupational position, working time, et
cetera, beside the standard demographic characteristics (age, sex, educational attain-
ment, nationality, et cetera). The major concept is the labor force concept, but the
subsistence concept is still part of the LFS and also questions related to the PES are
asked. The sample, which is randomly drawn from the Central Register of Residence
Registrations, consists of nine relatively equal-sized “province-samples” with exception of
Vienna (larger sampler) and Burgenland (smaller sample). The total number of house-
holds per quarter is about 23.000, where data on all household members, are collected.
The rate of non response is relatively small, since all people aged 18+ are subject to
8Wooldridge (2006), p. 586.
9Austria’s accession to the European Union.
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the duty of disclosure10 and are penalized with a fine up to EUR 2.180 when refusing
to participate. A household drops out of the sample after 5 quarters or 5 interviews
respectively.
3.2.2 Restrictions
The pooled sample containing all four years consists of 40,407 observations and more
than 200 variables - most of them not useful to my research question. After dropping
people aged less than 15 years and older than 69 years, which is plausible since people
younger than 15 years are considered to be out-of-labor according to all concepts and
people older 69 years not out-of-labor force are quiet rare in Austria11 (28.07 percent of
the sample), 29,063 observations remain. I created a sample for each of the concepts.
The division into employed, unemployed and out-of-labor force for the LFC and the
LUK is quite simple, a variable is already provided in the sample, but it turned out to
be very difficult to apply the PES definition. A detailed description of the transition to
a PES conform sample can be found in the appendix.
Because of very few respondents reporting being employed or have been employed12 in
the industries mining and quarrying, private households and extra-territorial organiza-
tions and activities of households bodies, I used two versions. One where the industries
mentioned above were dropped and another one, with female industries, defined as in-
dustries with a large fraction of female employees, where these industries are included.
Furthermore, the sample is restricted to (former) employees, due to several problems
arising when self-employed are included in the sample (multicollinearity between in-
dustry and occupation or professional position, rarely self-employed reporting to be
unemployed). The last restriction was made upon the class of worker. Usually civil
workers can not be unemployed, although some reported to be, which seldomly can
happen, but made me wonder whether they were civil workers or Vertragsbedienstete13.
Just to be on the safe side, I only used private sector workers.
10Erwerbs- und Wohnungsstatistikverordnung (EWStV), BGBl. II Nr. 549/2003.
11The statutory retirement age for men (women) is 65 (60) years.
12When using yearly samples instead of the pooled sample of all years those industries perfectly pre-
dicted being employed in almost all years.
13Individuals, who are working in the public sector, but do have contracts as blue or white collar
workers.
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3.2.3 Descriptive Statistics
The pooled LFC-sample contains 14,396 observations of which 6,669 are female and
7,727 are male. The overall unemployment rate is 4.83 percent, which is close to the
reported rates in section 2.2.1, the female unemployment rate is 5.22 percent and the
male rate is 4.50 percent. In each age group except for 55-69 years the fraction of
men is larger then the fraction of women. About 15.56 percent of the sample reported
that they were born in another country than Austria. In higher educational groups the
fraction of men and women is relatively equal. About 7.11 percent of men attained an
academic degree at university or at a Fachhochschule14 and about 6.21 percent of women
finished their academic career. Women attend post secondary technical/vocational ed-
ucation (HLA - Hochschulverwandte Lehranstalt) more than twice as much as men.
The share of women in higher-level technical/vocational colleges (BHS - Berufsbildende
höhere Schule) almost equals the share of men. The overall share of people in five-
year BHS (BHS5) is 8.88 percent and 9.03 percent in one-to-three-year BHS (BHS3).
Upper-secondary academic school (AHS - Allgeinbildende höhere Schule) is again more
frequent among women, with a share of 6.24 percent among women and 3.79 percent
among men. In lower educational groups men tend to attain apprenticeship as high-
est formal education - 53.68 percent of all men, but only 33.45 percent of all women.
Among women medium-level technical/vocational school (BMS - Berufsbildende mit-
tlere Schule) is more poupular than among men, 19.79 percent of all women attended a
medium-level technical/vocational school but only 7.64 percent of all men did. About
one half of the men are white collar workers and 71.64 percent of the women. Applying a
70-30 rule for industries, defining a female industry as an industry with a fraction of fe-
male workers greater than 70 percent and a male industry as an industry with a fraction
of female workers less than 30 percent, mining and quarying, manufactoring of wood,
paper, furniture, metal and machinery, electricity, gas and water supply, construction
and repair of cars/motorcycles are male dominated industries, while retail trade, hotels
and restaurants, education and health and social work are female dominated.
Table 3.1: Summary statistics for the labor force concept
Variable All Men Women
Number of observations 14,396 7,727 6,669
Unemployed 0.0483 0.0450 0.0522
Female 0.4633 0.0000 1.0000
14In the following university refers to university and Fachhochschule.
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Table 3.1: continued
Variable All Men Women
Age
15-19 0.0661 0.0723 0.0588
20-24 0.1092 0.1048 0.1143
25-29 0.1104 0.1082 0.1131
30-34 0.1264 0.1241 0.1291
35-39 0.1556 0.1532 0.1583
40-44 0.1541 0.1531 0.1552
45-49 0.1257 0.1211 0.1309
50-54 0.0871 0.0859 0.0885
55-69 0.0654 0.0771 0.0519
Not born in Austria 0.1556 0.1584 0.1523
Highest Formal Education
Compulsory school 0.1970 0.1774 0.2197
Apprenticeship 0.4431 0.5368 0.3345
BMS 0.1327 0.0764 0.1979
AHS 0.0492 0.0379 0.0624
BHS5 0.0888 0.0841 0.0943
BHS3 0.0090 0.0083 0.0099
HLA 0.0132 0.0080 0.0192
University 0.0669 0.0710 0.0621
White collar worker 0.5979 0.4955 0.7164
Industry
Mining and quarrying 0.0033 0.0054 0.0009
Manufacturing
Food, beverages and tobacco 0.0270 0.0290 0.0246
Textiles and leather 0.0144 0.0100 0.0196
Wood, paper, furniture 0.0501 0.0690 0.0282
Coke, petroleum, chemicals, plastics 0.0210 0.0273 0.0138
Metal, machinery 0.1271 0.1843 0.0609
Electricity, gas and water supply 0.0089 0.0119 0.0054
Construction 0.1100 0.1800 0.0289
Repair of cars/motorcycles 0.0265 0.0392 0.0118
Wholesale 0.0499 0.0568 0.0418
Retail trade 0.1125 0.0549 0.1792
Hotels and restaurants 0.0745 0.0405 0.1138
Transport, storage, communication 0.0611 0.0786 0.0408
Financial intermediation 0.0420 0.0369 0.0480
Real estate, renting, business activities 0.0797 0.0698 0.0912
Public administration and defence; compulsory social security 0.0340 0.0280 0.0411
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Table 3.1: continued
Variable All Men Women
Education 0.0268 0.0141 0.0415
Health and social work 0.0870 0.0333 0.1493
Other community, social and personal service activities 0.0441 0.0312 0.0591
Professional position
No formal skills (manual and non-manual) 0.0944 0.0660 0.1273
Apprenticeship contract 0.0496 0.0594 0.0382
Low skilled (manual) 0.2073 0.2072 0.2074
Medium skilled (manual) 0.1954 0.2650 0.1147
Medium skilled (non-manual) 0.2509 0.1614 0.3546
High skilled 0.0949 0.0928 0.0973
Highly qualified (non-manual) 0.0383 0.0437 0.0321
High skilled (manual) 0.0200 0.0339 0.0039
Managers (non-manual) 0.0492 0.0705 0.0244
Region
Burgenland 0.0796 0.0771 0.0825
Northern Austria 0.2386 0.2443 0.2320
Southern Austria 0.2160 0.2217 0.2095
Western Austria 0.3527 0.3485 0.3576
Vienna 0.1130 0.1083 0.1185
Household size 3.2619 3.3325 3.1801
Single parent 0.0901 0.0664 0.1176
Married 0.5143 0.5140 0.5146
Owning an apartment 0.0902 0.0849 0.0963
Owning a house 0.5208 0.5390 0.4996
Quarter
First 0.2453 0.2437 0.2473
Second 0.2485 0.2539 0.2423
Third 0.2572 0.2525 0.2626
Fourth 0.2490 0.2499 0.2479
Year
2004 0.2452 0.2467 0.2435
2005 0.2458 0.2483 0.2428
2006 0.2524 0.2496 0.2555
2007 0.2567 0.2553 0.2582
Table 3.1 presents means of personal, job, household and time characteristics of men, women and all people
in the labor force concept sample.
After applying the subsistence concept 14,522 observations remain. The resulting
sample contains 46 percent women, who have an unemployment rate of 6.7 percent.
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The unemployment rate among men is 6.9 percent. The overall unemployment rate
in the pooled LUK-sample with 6.81 percent is about 2 percentage points above the
LFC-rate with a smaller and reversed gap between the female and the male rate. Most
characteristics including the (fe)male industries are quite similar to those of the LFC
(see Table B.3).
The PES conform sample contains 13,727 observations of which 43.38 percent are female.
The overall unemployment rate is 6.61 percent. As in the case of the LFC the female
rate, 7.11 percent, is above the male rate, 6.23 percent. Again most of the characteristics
are very similar to the LFC and the subsistence concept (see Table B.4). While male
industries are the same as for the LFC and the LUK, female industries are reduced
to retail trade and health and social work. Remembering the unemployment rates
introduced in chapter 2, the construction of a PES conform sample seems to have failed.
Although the male unemployment rate in the PES sample should be above the female
one, it is the other way around. The female unemployment rate is about 0.87 percentage
point higher than the male unemployment rate. The causes of this reversion cannot be
identified, but there are some explanations for this. The data set lacks information
on marginal work, thus it is not possible to exactly distinguish marginal work from
part time. The share of female part timers is larger than the share of male part time
workers. My construction of the PES sample may push part time workers out of the
labor force, because they are assumed to be marginal workers, who would have been in
the labor force according to the national definition. This misclassification increases the
observed unemployment rate in the PES sample and affects the female rate more than
the male rate. Another explanation could be that men have a higher tendency to lie
about their unemployment experience, because of social pressure to fit in the role of the
male bread-earner.
3.3 Results
When using female as the only explanatory variable, a significant positive effect for the
LFC and the national concept, for the linear probability model, the probit model and
the logit model is observable. Female increases the probability of being unemployed by
about 0.7-0.9 percentage point. These numbers may seem small, but relating them to
the relatively low unemployment in Austria, this effect is not so small. For the labor
force concept women have a 15.9 percent higher unemployment probability than men.
In the case of the national concept, women’s probability exceeds that of men by 14
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percent. According to the subsistence concept, female has a negative but insignificant
impact on the unemployment probability.
Table 3.2: Results on female
Model Coeff. Std.Err. Marg.Eff.
LFC
LPM 0.0071* 0.0037 0.0071
Probit 0.0710* 0.0356 0.0071
Logit 0.1548* 0.0777 0.0071
LUK
LPM −0.0026 0.0043 −0.0026
Probit −0.0197 0.0319 −0.0026
Logit −0.0409 0.0662 −0.0026
PES
LPM 0.0087** 0.0043 0.0087
Probit 0.0676* 0.0332 0.0087
Logit 0.1405* 0.0470 0.0087
Table 3.2 presents the estimation results, when the dummy
variable female is the only explanatory variable. The reported
coeffiecients, standard errors and marginal effects are those
of the dummy variable female.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Ignoring any other explanatory variables causes an omitted variable bias, because
effects that systematically vary with sex are captured by the female dummy variable.
For example the different distribution concerning education and industry are partly
captured by female and partly enter the residuals. Moreover, we are interested in the
effect of being female given a certain age, educational attainment et cetera. Thus
I control for these characteristics step by step. After controlling for age education,
land of birth, white collar workers, industries or female industries respectively, region
and domestic variables, being female loses its impact according to all definitions of
unemployment (Table 3.3). The full regression outputs are provided in Appendix B.
Besides the probit estimate in the PES sample, none of the estimated coefficients on
female are significant. Interestingly, though statistically insignificant, the coefficient on
female in the LFC sample when using the linear probability model now is negative.
Table 3.3: Results on female controlled
Model Coeff. Std.Err. Marg.Eff.
LFC
LPM −0.0004 0.0045 −0.0004
Probit 0.0379 0.0445 0.0031
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Table 3.3: continued
Model Coeff. Std.Err. Marg.Eff.
Logit 0.0493 0.0950 0.0017
LUK
LPM −0.0073 0.0051 −0.0073
Probit −0.0296 0.0409 −0.0031
Logit −0.0862 0.0835 −0.0039
PES
LPM 0.0047 0.0051 0.0047
Probit 0.0779* 0.0427 0.0079
Logit 0.1320 0.0874 0.0059
Table 3.3 presents the estimation results for thethe dummy
variable female, controlled for age, education, land of birth,
white collar worker, industries, professional positions, regions,
single parent, married, owning a house or an appartment and
quarters. The reported coeffiecients, standard errors and
marginal effects are those of the dummy variable female.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Age does not play an important role except for the age groups 15-19 years and 55-69
years. Being 15-19 years old significantly decreases the probability of being unemployed
in all concepts. Which is consistent with Austria’s traditionally low unemployment
among young people. The age group 55-69 has an increasing effect on the unemploy-
ment probability in the subsistence and the national concept. Reflecting the harder
labor market conditions for elderly people, since firms tend to hire young people. The
insignificant negative effect in the labor force concept might be explained by two factors:
First, people in this age group being marginal workers are considered as employed even
though they already entered the advanced or the regular pension system and thus are
classified as out of labor force in the other two concepts. Second, since the labor market
for these people is tighter than for other age groups, the probability ending up as a
discouraged worker waiting to enter the pension system is higher. Discouraged workers
are considered to be out of labor force according to the LFC, but dependent on being
registered at the PES are unemployed according to the national concept. When consid-
ering the LUK, it depends on whether discouraged workers tend to report themselves as
unemployed. Almost every additional education to compulsory schooling decreases the
probability of unemployment. The educational effect is present in each of the concepts,
but the LPM found those effects to be more significant than the probit and the logit
model. For example holding an academic degree has a negative but insignificant effect
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in the LFC when estimating the probit and the logit models. Furthermore, there are no
differences in the magnitude of the effects. An apprenticeship has the same decreasing
effect as an academic secondary school and an academic degree. The country of origin
has an increasing impact in the LFC and the LUK, but is insignificant in the PES. One
has to be careful in interpreting this as discrimination against workers with migration
background. The data, for example, does not provide any information about language
skills, which of course play a major role in hiring migrants. The insignificant PES esti-
mate may be due to lacking eligibility of benefits. Industries with strong seasonality are
found to be significantly positive. In all concepts and models retail trade, construction
and hotels and restaurants have an increasing effect15, although controlling for quarters.
The most influential group of explanatory variables is professional position. Every ad-
ditional skill level decreases the unemployment probability throughout all concepts and
models. The linear probability model estimates decreases of more than five percentage
points. The partial effects of the probit and the logit model are smaller with decreases of
more than 2 percentage points in the probit case and even smaller estimates in the logit
case. Regions are important in determining the unemployment probability. Except for
Burgenland all other regions have a highly significant negative impact. Unfortunately,
it is not clear what these region variables measure exactly. One part of their impact
is due to different labor market conditions in different regions, but there may well be
industrial effects of industries concentrated in those regions and mobility effects. Being
married decreases the probability in all concepts. This could be the result of decreasing
firms reputation,when firing a married person, or that married individuals, especially
men, are more productive, due to a relatively stable life style and less household respon-
sibilities. In contrast, a single parent has a significantly higher probability in the LFC
and the LUK case. An explanation could be the lower productivity as it is not possible
to share household and child caring responsibilities with their partners. Less flexibility
because of the closing hours of kindergartens or school holidays could be an additional
explanation. As expected the quarters do not have importance in the LFC sample, but
in the LUK as well as in the PES sample. The probability of unemployment is lowest in
the third quarter and reaches its maximum in the first quarter. It is about 2-3 percent
lower in the third quarter than in the first quarter depending on the applied concept
and model. But some of the seasonal effects are captured by the industry dummies,
15Due to climatic conditions constructions and hotels and restaurants face a strong seasonality. While
during the cold winter construction is almost shut down, hotels and restaurants has the skiing
season. During the summer hotels and restaurants has its second shorter season and construction
has its main season.
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especially for construction and hotels and restaurants.
In order to check the poolability of the four years, I allowed the intercept to vary over
time. Since in all regression they were jointly insignificant, I dropped them. Female and
male industries were not significant and thus these results are not reported.
The interesting point is, when the female variable becomes insignificant in the LFC and
the PES version - after controlling for industry or professional position. Two possible
explanations for this result are: First, every skill level lowers the unemployment proba-
bility, but the fraction of women having no formal skills is larger than the male fraction.
Second, the fraction of highly skilled women (manual and non manual), is lower than the
fraction of men. The decreasing impact of professional position is strongest for highly
skilled individuals. Consequently, taking professional position into account lowers the
higher female unemployment probability down to a level of no significance. The sex
separated regressions also indicate, that men and women have different marginal effects
with a higher decrease for men. Thus controlling for professional position might mask
another discriminatory process such as glass ceiling effects16. The same seems to be true,
when using occupations instead of professional position with a larger equalizing effect
between men and women. Omitting industry and professional position in estimating
the female impact one obtains a highly significant positive effect, no matter whether
the linear probability, the probit or the logit model is used and no matter whether the
LFC or the PES concept is applied. But one has to be aware of the omitted variable
bias which occurs due to ignoring industry or professional position.
The sex separated regressions also indicate that the impact of some other variables
varies with respect to sex. For example, none of the regional dummy variables, except
for Burgenland, is significant in the female regression, contrary to the male regression.
The same is true for quarters, which are insignificant in the female sample, but signifi-
cant in the male sample. Comparing the female, male and overall sample it seems, that
the significance in the overall sample is almost always driven by one of the subgroups.
To evaluate whether the determinants of the unemployment probability vary with sex, I
run a Chow test for the linear regressions, which verifies the consideration of differences
in the male and the female model.
In order to analyze, which of the explanatory variables widen and which of them narrow
the initial gap, for the specification with female as the only regressor, a Cotton decom-
position is done.
It seems that the LPM captures the main features. Thus I only use the linear probabil-
16Cf. Cotter, David A. et al. (2001), p. 657.
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ity model for all further analyses, because its underlying linearity makes it much easier
to handle. For example, see Farilie (1999) for a Blinder Oaxaca-style decomposition in
a non-linear world. While the linear version introduced by Blinder and Oaxaca uses
only some basic calculations, the decomposition proposed by Fairlie needs a matching
process for the subgroups and a reordering procedure for the regressors without any
guarantee that convergence is achieved. Adding interaction terms to compare the male
and female results is not straight forward in the case of non-linear functions, if partial
effects are of interest. The interaction effect could be different from zero even if the
interaction coefficient is equal to zero, the interaction effect can have different signs for
different observations and statistical inference can not be based on the coefficient but
on the whole derivate.
3.3.1 Chow Breakpoint Test
A Chow test is an F-test testing for structural breaks in the coefficients of a linear
regression or in other words testing whether the coefficients of two linear regressions on
different subgroups of a sample or different data sets are equal to each other.
The unrestricted model is
yi = β10 + β11x1i + β12x2i + . . .+ β1kxki +  (3.16)
where i = 1, . . . , n1 and
yi = β20 + β21x1i + β22x2i + . . .+ β2kxki +  (3.17)
where i = 1, . . . , n2.
The restricted model is
yi = β0 + β1x1i + β2x2i + . . .+ βkxki +  (3.18)
where = 1, . . . , n = n1 + n2.
We want to test
H0 : β10 = β20 ∧ β11 = β21 ∧ β12 = β22 ∧ . . . ∧ β1k = β2k
against
H1 : β10 6= β20 ∨ β11 6= β21 ∨ β12 6= β22 ∨ . . . ∨ β1k 6= β2k
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This can be done by a F-test
F =
RSSR− USSR
USSR
p
n− 2p (3.19)
where RSSR is the sum of squared residuals from the restricted model, USSR is the sum
of squared residuals from the unrestricted model, which is simply the sum of the sum
of squared residuals from (3.16) and (3.17), n is the number of observations and p is
the number of parameters. Equation (3.19) holds in the absence of heteroskedasticity.
“Unfortunately, as with any F test based on sums of squared residuals or R-squared,
this test is not robust to heteroskedasticity."17 A robust version of the Chow test can-
not be computed by using the sum of squared residuals. Alternatively one can use a
heteroskedasticity robust Wald statistic
W = (Rβˆ − r)′(RVˆR′)−1(Rβˆ − r) (3.20)
where H0 : Rβ = r, R is a q × k matrix with q being the number of restrictions and
rank(R) = q ≤ k, r is a q × 1 vector and Vˆ is the heteroskedasticity robust variance
matrix estimator18. Under the null hypothesis the Wald statistic is asymptotically χ2q
distributed.
Using the heteroskedasticity robust Wald test, one estimates the fully interacted model,
allowing the intercept and the slope to vary with the groups (here sex), and tests all the
interactions jointly against zero. This procedure restricts the variance of the residuals
to be equal in the groups when pooling the data. But since there are no big differences
in any of the concepts it is not necessary to apply a technique without constraining the
variance.
The null hypothesis is clearly rejected at 5 percent in each concept. Thus the model for
men differs from the model for women.
Table 3.4: Wald statistics and p-values
Concept Wald statistic p-value
LFC 1.42 0.0259
LUK 1.56 0.0069
PES 1.68 0.0018
Table 3.4 presents the Wald statistics
and corresponding p-values for the fully
17Wooldridge (2006), p. 454.
18Equation (3.6).
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Table 3.4: continued
Concept Wald statistic p-value
interacted model.
3.3.2 Interaction terms
In section 3.3.1 the evidence for the differences in the female and the male model has
been shown. Now, I investigate these differences more detailed, which is done by block-
wise testing, adding separately all age variables, all educational variables, et cetera and
test them separately. The results are reported in Table 3.5. While the impact of age,
education, country of origin, white collar worker, industry and owning an appartment
does not vary with sex, all other blocks show at least a weak tendency to be different
for women with all of them indicating a higher female probability within the blocks.
Table 3.5: Wald statistics and p-values for the blockwise interacted models
Block
LFC LUK PES
Wald p-value Wald p-value Wald p-value
Age 1.20 0.2933 1.02 0.4184 1.71 0.0897
Education 1.66 0.1146 0.94 0.4772 0.67 0.6969
Not born in Austria 0.01 0.9394 1.15 0.2843 0.54 0.4618
White collar worker 0.27 0.6020 0.00 0.9925 0.01 0.9120
Industry 1.15 0.3074 0.78 0.6903 1.36 0.1611
Professional position 1.76 0.0799 2.88 0.0034 2.53 0.0096
Region 2.67 0.0303 4.51 0.0012 1.60 0.1725
Single parent 0.44 0.5066 4.92 0.0266 2.45 0.1161
Married 1.38 0.2398 2.96 0.0855 0.99 0.3190
Owning an apartment 0.06 0.8108 0.19 0.6649 0.05 0.8289
Owning a house 6.56 0.0104 13.41 0.0003 2.78 0.0958
Quarter 1.58 0.1919 2.65 0.0474 5.55 0.0008
Table 3.5 presents the Wald statistics and corresponding p-values for the blockwise
interacted modell. Each block (age, education, et cetera) is separately added to model
with female being the only explanatory, and is separately tested.
The subsistence concept contains most differences with 6 blocks being significant at
least at a 10 percent level. The effect of professional position, region, single parent,
married, owning a house and quarter are different for women. The impact of profes-
sional position varies with sex in all of the concept. While the female interactions with
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region and owning an apartment are found to be significant in the labor force and the
subsistence concept, there is no evidence that women have different coefficients in the
national concept. The interaction effect of single parent and married is found to be
significant in the subsistence concept only. The concept with the lowest seasonality -
the labor force concept - does not show any differences of the seasonality concerning
sex. When the seasonality becomes stronger as in the case of the subsistence and the
national concept one can indeed find sex differences.
3.3.3 Decomposition
The interpretation of the estimation results presented in Section 3.3 is that βˆj is the
effect of a one unit change of xj on the dependent variable, holding all other variables
fixed. According to this the female coefficient has to be interpreted as the effect of
being female given the same characteristics as men. It is already known from Section
3.2 that (on average) women are not endowed with the same characteristics as men.
The decomposition of the unemployment risk differential allows to explicitly incorporate
differences in endowments into the analysis.
Using the fact that the means of the explanatory variables and the dependent variable
lie on the estimation plane, one can decompose the unemployment risk differential of two
groups into two parts. One part of the differential is due to differences in endowments,
and thus explained, and the other part is due to differences in the risk returns of the
groups. The latter part is commonly interpreted as discrimination but captures the
effects of omitted variables as well.
A special case of such an decomposition was introduced by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca
(1973). Assuming a linear model
yi = β0 +
k∑
j=1
βjxji + i i = 1, . . . , n (3.21)
estimate (3.21) for both groups separately:
yHi = β
H
0 +
k∑
j=1
βHj x
H
ji + 
H
i i = 1, . . . , n
H (3.22)
yLi = β
L
0 +
k∑
j=1
βLj x
L
ji + i i = 1, . . . , n
L (3.23)
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where the superscripts H and L indicate either the high-probability/high-risk group or
the low-probability/low-risk group.19
A property of the ordinary least squares estimation is that
y¯ = β0 +
k∑
j=1
βjx¯j
and thus the raw differential of the average probability can be written as
y¯H − y¯L = x¯HβH − x¯LβL, (3.24)
where y¯i is the mean of the dependent variable, x¯i is a row vector containing the means
of the explanatory variables and βi is a vector containing the βj’s (i = H,L). Equation
(3.24) can be extended to
y¯H − y¯L = (x¯H − x¯L) βL + x¯L (βH − βL) + (x¯H − x¯L) (βH − βL)
= E + C + CE
E is that part of the raw differential, which is caused by differences in endowments.
Differences in the coefficients are described by C. The third part, CE, is the interaction
between endowments and coefficients.
Using
x¯HβH − x¯LβL = x¯HβH − x¯LβH + x¯LβH − x¯LβL
= (x¯H − x¯L) βH + x¯L (βH − βL)
equation (3.24) can then further be rewritten as
y¯H − y¯L = (x¯H − x¯L) βH + x¯L (βH − βL) (3.25)
Equation (3.25) is a high-probability group based decomposition of the raw differential in
average probability, the left-hand side of (3.25), into an explained part, i.e. differences
in endowments, the first term on the right-hand side, and an unexplained part, i.e
differences in coefficients, the second term on the right-hand side.
19Probability and risk are used interchangeably.
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A low-probability group based decomposition has the form
y¯H − y¯L = (x¯H − x¯L) βL + x¯H (βH − βL) . (3.26)
The difference of (3.25) and (3.26) can be found in their assumption about the non-
discriminatory world. The high-probability based version assumes that in the absence
of discrimination the high-probability group’s risk return would prevail. Vice versa the
low-probability group’s risk return structure would prevail in the low-probability based
version. In other words, (3.25) presumes pure nepotism toward the low-probability
group, while (3.26) presumes pure discrimination of the high-probability group. Which
one is true or whether both are true depends on the taste of the discriminator. “The
true nature of discrimination may be empirically indiscernible."20 Furthermore, when
applying W = I oder W = 0 actual differences in the risk returns are evaluated either
at the high risk groups characteristics or the low risk characteristics, which ignores that
the groups do not have the same characteristics. More generally the decomposition can
be written as
y¯H − y¯L = (x¯H − x¯L) [WβH + (I −W )βL] + [x¯H(I −W ) + x¯LW ] (βH − βL) , (3.27)
where W is a diagonal weighting matrix and I is the identity matrix. Setting W = I
yields the high-probability based version. If W is the nullmatrix one gets the low-
probability based decomposition. Several weighting matrices are proposed in the litera-
ture by different authors mainly with respect to the decomposition of wage differentials.
Reimers (1983) proposed to use the unweighted mean between the low-groups and the
high-groups coefficients or setting the diagonal elements of W equal to 0.5 respectively.
Cotton (1988) proposed to use the relative group size for weighting the coefficients, i.e.
W = fHI, where fH is the relative frequency of the high-risk group. Using the coeffi-
cients from a pooled model was suggested by Neumark (1988).
For this analysis I choose Cotton’s decomposition. This means I implicitly make two
presumptions. Firstly, there is nepotism, as well as, discrimination. Secondly, in ab-
sence of nepotism and discrimination the risk returns equal the weighted means of the
current returns, where the weights are the groups relative frequency. Hence in absence
of discrimination the risk returns are between the current risk returns of both groups,
but closer to that of the larger group.
20Neumark (1988), p. 285.
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Table 3.6: Cotton decomposition
LFC LUK PES
Prediction men 0.0450 0.0693 0.0623
Prediction women 0.0522 0.0667 0.0711
Difference (R) 0.0071 0.0026 0.0087
due to endowments (E) 0.0130 0.0060 0.0080
due to coefficients (C) 0.0090 0.0140 0.0100
due to interaction (CE) −0.0150 −0.0180 −0.0090
fH 0.4630 0.5400 0.4340
Explained (E) 0.0060 −0.0034 0.0039
Unexplained (U) 0.0012 0.0059 0.0049
E/R as % 83.5000 −129.5000 44.1000
U/R as % 16.5000 229.5000 55.9000
Women are the high-risk group in the LFC and the PES decomposition
Men are the high-risk group in the LUK decomposition
For the labor force concept the raw sex differential of the unemployment risk is 0.72
percentage points. 83.5% of this difference is due to differences in characteristics. The
unexplained or discriminatory part accounts for 16.5%. When looking at the PES the
raw differential, 0.87 percentage points, is somewhat higher than in the labor force
concept. The unexplained part accounts for 55.9%, while the explained part accounts
for 44.1%. The interpretation of the results in the LUK case is not so straight forward,
since the explained part exceeds 100% and the unexplained part is negative. The raw
differential is 0.03 percentage points, with men facing the higher risk. If men and women
had the same characteristics, the male risk would be 0.06 percentage points higher than
the female one. Or in other words, if men and women had the same endowments, then
the new differential would be 2.29 times of the actual differential or the actual differential
would increase by 129%. According to that, women are better off than men.
When comparing these results to other choices of W , the results are highly sensitive
to a particular choice. The only concept which draws a clear picture, is the PES.
Independently from the choice ofW , i.e. independently whether one assumes that there
is nepotism or discrimination or both, one can find discrimination or at least unexplained
differences, which causes women to have a higher unemployment risk. Nevertheless the
LFC decompositions tend to find a higher unexplained risk for women, and the LUK
decompositions tend to find a higher unexplained risk for men.
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I analyzed whether women have a higher probability of being unemployed using data
from the Austrian labor force survey for 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007. Ignoring other
characteristics women have a 0.7-0.9 percentage points higher probability of being un-
employed than men, when applying the labor force concepts and the national concept.
These findings are somewhat smaller than the results of Azmat, Guell and Manning
(2006), who found that women’s unemployment probability is one percentage point
higher. Although this difference is relatively small in absolute terms, it means that the
unemployment risk of women is 14-16% higher than that of men. Applying the subsis-
tence concept yields a negative but statistically insignificant impact for women. After
taking into account other observables such as age, education, industry, professional occu-
pation, et cetera, the female-male gap virtually disappears. The main equalizing effects
are those of professional position and industries, which were not taken into account by
Azmat, Guell and Manning (2006). It is very likely that controlling for professional
position masks a glass ceiling effect, a discriminatory process against women to prevent
them to reach higher career levels.
Sex separated regressions indicate different male and female models. This is verified by
a Chow test and adding interactions with the female dummy in the pooled regression.
The impact of professional position varies with sex in all concepts. While the female
interactions with region and owning a house are found to be significant in the labor force
and the subsistence concept, there is no evidence that women have different coefficients
in the national concept. The interaction effect of single parent and being married is
found to be significant in the subsistence concept only. The concept with the lowest
seasonality - the labor force concept - does not show any differences in seasonality with
respect to sex. In the case of the subsistence and the national concept, the seasonality
effect becomes stronger, and one can indeed find sex differences. The sex separated
regressions suggested an effect of female interacted with industries. This effect was not
confirmed.
Using a Cotton decomposition, I decomposed the raw sex difference in the mean unem-
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ployment probability into an explained and an unexplained part. The unexplained part
is usually interpreted as discrimination. I found an unexplained part of 16.5% of the raw
differential in the LFC case and 55.9% in the PES case. I found the lowest difference in
the LUK case, where men have a higher probability of about 0.3 percentage points. If
men and women had the same characteristics, this difference would double. Comparing
these results to other coefficient weighting schemes, showed that the results are highly
sensitive to the choice of the weighting matrix.
The effect of the probably higher labor supply elasticity of women was not taken into
account. This possibly causes a selection bias in all of the results. Theoretically, assum-
ing that women with worse labor market prospect - usually lower educated, lower skilled
women - , do not join the labor market at all, decreases the sex gap in the unemploy-
ment probability and perhaps lowers a discrimination effect. This could be overcome
by using a Heckit procedure in estimations and to incorporate the Mills ratio in the
decomposition1. Since the data set does not provide many additional variables which
can be used in the selection equation of the Heckit procedure, another approach may be
to include out-of-labor force women as unemployed women under certain circumstances.
In general, the analysis points out that the impact of being female depends on the ap-
plied concept. Not only the effect of being female is different when applying various
concepts of unemployment, but also the differences between men and women differ,
when using other definitions of unemployment. The analysis lacks a correction for sam-
ple selection, which is assumed to dampen the actual unexplained part or discriminatory
effect.
In sum there seems to be a tendency that women face a higher risk of being unemployed
due to discrimination or some unexplained differences between men and women, when
applying the labor force concept and the national concept. In contrast, using the subsis-
tence concept this tendency reversed. The unemployment risk of men is unexplainable
higher than that of women. The exact causes of this reversion, i.e. the interconcept
differences, remain unanswered and are open to further investigations.
1Cf. Reimers (1983).
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A Figures
Source: Statistik Austria - Statistisches Jahrbuch 2008
Figure A.1: Structure of social expenditure by function in 1990 and 2005
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Figure A.2: Labor force concept
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Table B.1: Social expenditure for unemployment in Mio. EUR
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Unemployment benefita 947.20 1,115.25 1,120.47 1,100.50 1,136.90
Unemployment assistance and
529.14 593.87 661.28 712.09 713.51
special unemployment assistancea
Special benefit and transitional allowance 44.85 42.61 40.59 56.63 88.25
Early retirement pension for unemployed 160.30 156.14 142.44 101.17 60.12
Bankruptcy contingeny fund 197.54 224.91 305.75 259.09 227.34
Active and activating labor market
889.97 1057.92 1372.02 1539.43 1514.41
policies - Public Employment Serviceb
Labor market support schemes -
105.42 113.35 128.04 150.45 147.70
Ausgleichstaxfonds, “Behindertenmilliarde”
Other social benefitsc 37.24 51.88 40.73 41.73 51.19
Total 2,911.66 3,355.92 3,811.31 3,961.09 3,939.43
a Without activated passive funds.
b Skill training measures, measures to improve occupational/regional mobility, (re-)employment measures,
unemployment benefit and assistance while on training, part-time benefit for older workers, . . .
c Labor market support schemes of the “Länder”, exemptions from charges, bad weather compensation, short-time
working support.
Table B.2: Growth rate of real GDP
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Growth 1.9 2.6 1.8 3.6 3.3 3.4 0.8 0.9 1.2 2.3 2.0 3.3
Source: EUROSTAT
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Table B.3: Summary statistics for the subsistence concepts
Variable All Men Women
Number of observations 14,522 7,836 6,686
Unemployed 0.0681 0.0693 0.0667
Female 0.4604 0.0000 1.0000
Age
15-19 0.0635 0.0701 0.0558
20-24 0.1072 0.1018 0.1135
25-29 0.1125 0.1064 0.1197
30-34 0.1292 0.1254 0.1336
35-39 0.1552 0.1529 0.1579
40-44 0.1534 0.1540 0.1527
45-49 0.1248 0.1220 0.1282
50-54 0.0882 0.0883 0.0881
55-69 0.0659 0.0790 0.0506
Not born in Austria 0.1627 0.1628 0.1626
Highest Formal Education
Compulsory school 0.1997 0.1794 0.2235
Apprenticeship 0.4491 0.5435 0.3385
BMS 0.1312 0.0759 0.1961
AHS 0.0452 0.0342 0.0582
BHS5 0.0868 0.0812 0.0935
BHS3 0.0089 0.0082 0.0097
HLA 0.0125 0.0079 0.0179
University 0.0665 0.0697 0.0627
White collar worker 0.5889 0.4862 0.7092
Industry
Mining and quarrying 0.0034 0.0056 0.0009
Manufacturing
Food, beverages and tobacco 0.0270 0.0288 0.0248
Textiles and leather 0.0149 0.0101 0.0205
Wood, paper, furniture 0.0508 0.0696 0.0289
Coke, petroleum, chemicals, plastics 0.0210 0.0271 0.0139
Metal, machinery 0.1266 0.1835 0.0600
Electricity, gas and water supply 0.0089 0.0117 0.0055
Construction 0.1133 0.1863 0.0277
Repair of cars/motorcycles 0.0267 0.0393 0.0120
Wholesale 0.0499 0.0560 0.0426
Retail trade 0.1116 0.0537 0.1795
Hotels and restaurants 0.0771 0.0405 0.1201
Transport, storage, communication 0.0610 0.0784 0.0407
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Table B.3: continued
Variable All Men Women
Financial intermediation 0.0408 0.0362 0.0462
Real estate, renting, business activities 0.0783 0.0678 0.0906
Public administration and defence; compulsory social security 0.0333 0.0274 0.0401
Education 0.0261 0.0137 0.0407
Health and social work 0.0851 0.0329 0.1463
Other community, social and personal service activities 0.0441 0.0314 0.0591
Professional Position
No formal skills (manual and non-manual) 0.0947 0.0673 0.1268
Apprenticeship contract 0.0496 0.0587 0.0390
Low skilled (manual) 0.2098 0.2094 0.2103
Medium skilled (manual) 0.1992 0.2694 0.1170
Medium skilled (non-manual) 0.2468 0.1584 0.3504
High skilled 0.0930 0.0909 0.0956
Highly qualified (non-manual) 0.0384 0.0431 0.0329
High skilled (manual) 0.0200 0.0336 0.0042
Managers (non-manual) 0.0483 0.0693 0.0238
Region
Burgenland 0.0794 0.0771 0.0821
Northern Austria 0.2385 0.2434 0.2327
Southern Austria 0.2203 0.2237 0.2163
Western Austria 0.3466 0.3458 0.3474
Vienna 0.1153 0.1100 0.1214
Household size 3.2648 3.3258 3.1934
Single parent 0.0909 0.0669 0.1191
Married 0.5161 0.5167 0.5154
Owning an apartment/ 0.0890 0.0835 0.0954
Owning a house 0.5127 0.5339 0.4879
Quarter
First 0.2482 0.2485 0.2480
Second 0.2476 0.2523 0.2420
Third 0.2536 0.2483 0.2598
Fourth 0.2506 0.2509 0.2502
Year
2004 0.2429 0.2469 0.2383
2005 0.2451 0.2481 0.2415
2006 0.2538 0.2499 0.2585
2007 0.2582 0.2551 0.2617
Table B.3 presents means of personal, job, household and time characteristics of men, women and all individuals
in the subsistence concept sample.
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Table B.4: Summary statistics for the national concept
Variable All Men Women
Number of observations 13,687 7,749 5,938
Unemployed 0.0661 0.0623 0.0711
Female 0.4338 0.0000 1.0000
Age
15-19 0.0670 0.0703 0.0626
20-24 0.1078 0.1026 0.1147
25-29 0.1047 0.1062 0.1027
30-34 0.1208 0.1258 0.1142
35-39 0.1550 0.1532 0.1573
40-44 0.1573 0.1537 0.1620
45-49 0.1301 0.1223 0.1401
50-54 0.0894 0.0867 0.0930
55-69 0.0679 0.0791 0.0534
Not born in Austria 0.1553 0.1600 0.1490
Highest Formal Education
Compulsory school 0.1977 0.1791 0.2220
Apprenticeship 0.4523 0.5423 0.3350
BMS 0.1309 0.0755 0.2033
AHS 0.0462 0.0352 0.0605
BHS5 0.0864 0.0819 0.0923
BHS3 0.0088 0.0084 0.0093
HLA 0.0119 0.0076 0.0175
University 0.0658 0.0699 0.0603
White collar worker 0.5861 0.4872 0.7152
Industry
Mining and quarrying 0.0036 0.0055 0.0010
Manufacturing
Food, beverages and tobacco 0.0274 0.0285 0.0259
Textiles and leather 0.0143 0.0101 0.0199
Wood, paper, furniture 0.0517 0.0694 0.0286
Coke, petroleum, chemicals, plastics 0.0214 0.0272 0.0138
Metal, machinery 0.1311 0.1844 0.0615
Electricity, gas and water supply 0.0092 0.0119 0.0057
Construction 0.1176 0.1870 0.0269
Repair of cars/motorcycles 0.0276 0.0396 0.0120
Wholesale 0.0500 0.0565 0.0416
Retail trade 0.1078 0.0532 0.1792
Hotels and restaurants 0.0747 0.0404 0.1194
Transport, storage, communication 0.0625 0.0785 0.0418
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Variable All Men Women
Financial intermediation 0.0408 0.0361 0.0470
Real estate, renting, business activities 0.0763 0.0667 0.0888
Public administration and defence; compulsory social security 0.0334 0.0277 0.0408
Education 0.0249 0.0134 0.0399
Health and social work 0.0829 0.0328 0.1484
Other community, social and personal service activities 0.0427 0.0310 0.0579
Professional Position
No formal skills (manual and non-manual) 0.0909 0.0667 0.1224
Apprenticeship contract 0.0511 0.0581 0.0421
Low skilled (manual) 0.2080 0.2111 0.2039
Medium skilled (manual) 0.2024 0.2684 0.1162
Medium skilled (non-manual) 0.2429 0.1577 0.3540
High skilled 0.0946 0.0916 0.0985
Highly qualified (non-manual) 0.0386 0.0431 0.0328
High skilled (manual) 0.0205 0.0336 0.0035
Managers (non-manual) 0.0509 0.0697 0.0264
Region
Burgenland 0.0794 0.0776 0.0818
Northern Austria 0.2385 0.2433 0.2322
Southern Austria 0.2188 0.2240 0.2120
Western Austria 0.3498 0.3479 0.3523
Vienna 0.1135 0.1072 0.1216
Household size 3.2434 3.3313 3.1288
Single parent 0.0894 0.0658 0.1201
Married 0.5099 0.5165 0.5013
Owning an apartment 0.0892 0.0840 0.0960
Owning a house 0.5202 0.5388 0.4960
Quarter
First 0.2474 0.2480 0.2465
Second 0.2475 0.2520 0.2417
Third 0.2544 0.2492 0.2612
Fourth 0.2507 0.2507 0.2506
Year
2004 0.2453 0.2467 0.2435
2005 0.2464 0.2484 0.2439
2006 0.2516 0.2487 0.2555
2007 0.2566 0.2562 0.2572
Table B.4 presents means of personal, job, household and time characteristics of men, women and all individuals
in the national concept sample.
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Table B.5: Estimation results labor force concept
Dependent variable: unemployed
Number of observation: 14,437
Variable LPM Probit Logit
Female −0.0004 (0.004) 0.0379 (0.045) 0.0493 (0.095)
15-19 −0.0345 (0.015)* −0.3200 (0.127)* −0.6731 (0.273)*
20-24 0.0089 (0.008) 0.0703 (0.077) 0.1543 (0.160)
25-29 0.0130 (0.008) 0.1149 (0.073) 0.2567 (0.153)
30-34 0.0055 (0.007) 0.0523 (0.072) 0.1143 (0.152)
35-39 −0.0008 (0.006) −0.0020 (0.070) −0.0213 (0.149)
45-49 −0.0039 (0.006) −0.0453 (0.075) −0.0883 (0.161)
50-54 −0.0135 (0.007)* −0.1800 (0.088)* −0.3654 (0.192)
55-69 −0.0058 (0.008) −0.0511 (0.094) −0.1044 (0.204)
Not born in Austria 0.0197 (0.007)** 0.1824 (0.052)*** 0.3269 (0.109)**
Apprenticeship −0.0268 (0.007)*** −0.2012 (0.054)*** −0.4199 (0.112)***
BMS −0.0249 (0.008)** −0.2097 (0.073)** −0.4161 (0.155)**
AHS −0.0347 (0.010)*** −0.2747 (0.100)** −0.5775 (0.212)**
BHS5 −0.0328 (0.009)*** −0.2643 (0.088)** −0.5680 (0.194)**
BHS3 −0.0424 (0.015)** −0.4023 (0.254) −0.8836 (0.598)
HLA −0.0231 (0.015) −0.1395 (0.194) −0.2844 (0.436)
University −0.0281 (0.010)** −0.1741 (0.104) −0.3563 (0.226)
White collar worker −0.0046 (0.006) −0.0562 (0.058) −0.1196 (0.123)
Food, beverages and tobacco 0.0297 (0.014)* 0.3059 (0.119)* 0.6276 (0.247)*
Textiles and leather 0.0244 (0.018) 0.2944 (0.152) 0.5759 (0.319)
Wood, paper, furniture 0.0150 (0.009) 0.2008 (0.106) 0.3968 (0.230)
Coke, petroleum, chemicals, plastics 0.0056 (0.013) 0.0997 (0.145) 0.1724 (0.314)
Metal, machinery 0.0042 (0.007) 0.0720 (0.087) 0.1299 (0.192)
Construction 0.0242 (0.008)** 0.2667 (0.086)** 0.5695 (0.185)**
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Table B.5: continued
Dependent variable: unemployed
Number of observation: 14,437
Variable LPM Probit Logit
Repair of cars/motorcycles 0.0081 (0.011) 0.1127 (0.137) 0.2284 (0.298)
Wholesale 0.0103 (0.009) 0.1431 (0.110) 0.2626 (0.241)
Retail trade 0.0233 (0.007)** 0.2619 (0.083)** 0.5477 (0.178)**
Hotels and restaurants 0.0462 (0.010)*** 0.4041 (0.084)*** 0.8220 (0.177)***
Transport, storage, communication 0.0060 (0.008) 0.0949 (0.103) 0.1961 (0.224)
Financial intermediation 0.0108 (0.009) 0.1554 (0.122) 0.2717 (0.275)
Real estate, renting, business activities 0.0134 (0.008) 0.1921 (0.089)* 0.3734 (0.191)
Health and social work −0.0062 (0.006) −0.1144 (0.102) −0.2669 (0.230)
Apprenticeship contract −0.0397 (0.019)* −0.1937 (0.132) −0.3491 (0.278)
Low skilled (manual) −0.0506 (0.010)*** −0.3096 (0.061)*** −0.5992 (0.121)***
Medium skilled (manual) −0.0589 (0.010)*** −0.4059 (0.073)*** −0.8125 (0.151)***
Medium skilled (non-manual) −0.0571 (0.011)*** −0.4008 (0.080)*** −0.7990 (0.166)***
High skilled −0.0680 (0.011)*** −0.5772 (0.108)*** −1.2484 (0.241)***
Highly qualified (non-manual) −0.0693 (0.012)*** −0.6456 (0.158)*** −1.4149 (0.372)***
High skilled (manual) −0.0731 (0.013)*** −0.6275 (0.182)*** −1.3660 (0.431)**
Managers (non-manual) −0.0582 (0.012)*** −0.4537 (0.130)*** −0.9580 (0.293)**
Burgenland −0.0046 (0.011) 0.0556 (0.081) 0.1067 (0.163)
Northern Austria −0.0373 (0.008)*** −0.2888 (0.066)*** −0.6023 (0.135)***
Southern Austria −0.0339 (0.008)*** −0.2527 (0.067)*** −0.5100 (0.137)***
Western Austria −0.0428 (0.008)*** −0.3453 (0.060)*** −0.7289 (0.122)***
Single parent 0.0261 (0.008)** 0.1928 (0.060)** 0.3841 (0.120)**
Married −0.0133 (0.005)** −0.1821 (0.047)*** −0.3864 (0.099)***
Owning an apartment −0.0195 (0.006)*** −0.2124 (0.078)** −0.4746 (0.176)**
Owning a house −0.0159 (0.004)*** −0.1812 (0.045)*** −0.4077 (0.098)***65
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Table B.5: continued
Dependent variable: unemployed
Number of observation: 14,437
Variable LPM Probit Logit
Second −0.0024 (0.005) −0.0218 (0.053) −0.0549 (0.111)
Third −0.0084 (0.005) −0.0899 (0.053) −0.1835 (0.112)
Fourth −0.0059 (0.005) −0.0495 (0.053) −0.1109 (0.112)
Constant 0.1607 (0.015)*** −0.9215 (0.115)*** −1.4430 (0.240)***
Table B.5 presents detailed estimation results for the linear probability, the probit and logit model when using the LFC sample.
Marginal effects of the probit and logit estimates are presented in Table B.8.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, standard errors in parantheses
Table B.6: Estimation results subsistence concept
Dependent variable: unemployed
Number of observations: 14,522
Variable LPM Probit Logit
Female −0.0073 (0.005) −0.0296 (0.041) −0.0862 (0.083)
15-19 −0.0401 (0.017)* −0.2850 (0.116)* −0.5630 (0.240)*
20-24 0.0085 (0.009) 0.0620 (0.070) 0.1412 (0.139)
25-29 −0.0023 (0.008) −0.0022 (0.069) 0.0113 (0.140)
30-34 −0.0017 (0.007) −0.0184 (0.067) −0.0147 (0.136)
35-39 −0.0048 (0.007) −0.0409 (0.065) −0.0902 (0.134)
45-49 0.0010 (0.007) 0.0122 (0.068) 0.0263 (0.139)
50-54 0.0072 (0.008) 0.0577 (0.073) 0.1287 (0.148)
55-69 0.0576 (0.011)*** 0.4135 (0.073)*** 0.8332 (0.142)***
Not born in Austria 0.0226 (0.008)** 0.1689 (0.048)*** 0.2930 (0.094)**
Apprenticeship −0.0290 (0.008)*** −0.1680 (0.048)*** −0.3257 (0.095)***
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Table B.6: continued
Dependent variable: unemployed
Number of observations: 14,522
Variable LPM Probit Logit
BMS −0.0238 (0.009)** −0.1495 (0.065)* −0.2645 (0.132)*
AHS −0.0375 (0.011)*** −0.2352 (0.097)* −0.4578 (0.199)*
BHS5 −0.0335 (0.010)*** −0.2144 (0.083)** −0.4342 (0.177)*
BHS3 −0.0309 (0.020) −0.1827 (0.210) −0.2946 (0.436)
HLA −0.0384 (0.014)** −0.3611 (0.223) −0.8100 (0.522)
University −0.0360 (0.011)*** −0.2199 (0.103)* −0.4738 (0.221)*
White collar worker −0.0161 (0.007)* −0.1236 (0.053)* −0.2484 (0.107)*
Food, beverages and tobacco 0.0175 (0.015) 0.1524 (0.111) 0.3075 (0.221)
Textiles and leather 0.0239 (0.020) 0.2004 (0.137) 0.4002 (0.271)
Wood, paper, furniture 0.0185 (0.011) 0.1684 (0.092) 0.3428 (0.187)
Coke, petroleum, chemicals, plastics −0.0032 (0.015) 0.0042 (0.132) −0.0104 (0.272)
Metal, machinery −0.0066 (0.008) −0.0575 (0.078) −0.1248 (0.163)
Construction 0.0428 (0.010)*** 0.2988 (0.074)*** 0.5993 (0.150)***
Repair of cars/motorcycles −0.0057 (0.012) −0.0697 (0.127) −0.1440 (0.265)
Wholesale 0.0025 (0.010) 0.0206 (0.101) 0.0079 (0.212)
Retail trade 0.0235 (0.009)** 0.2029 (0.075)** 0.3874 (0.153)*
Hotels and restaurants 0.0561 (0.012)*** 0.3744 (0.075)*** 0.7248 (0.150)***
Transport, storage, communication −0.0011 (0.009) −0.0044 (0.092) −0.0062 (0.192)
Financial intermediation −0.0064 (0.009) −0.1157 (0.125) −0.3121 (0.283)
Real estate, renting, business activities 0.0168 (0.010) 0.1755 (0.080)* 0.3144 (0.162)
Health and social work −0.0139 (0.007) −0.2012 (0.094)* −0.4363 (0.202)*
Apprenticeship contract −0.0785 (0.022)*** −0.3634 (0.123)** −0.6823 (0.251)**
Low skilled (manual) −0.0692 (0.012)*** −0.3138 (0.055)*** −0.5845 (0.103)***
Medium skilled (manual) −0.0802 (0.012)*** −0.4026 (0.064)*** −0.7730 (0.125)***67
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Table B.6: continued
Dependent variable: unemployed
Number of observations: 14,522
Variable LPM Probit Logit
Medium skilled (non-manual) −0.0843 (0.012)*** −0.4590 (0.074)*** −0.9074 (0.148)***
High skilled −0.1037 (0.013)*** −0.7682 (0.106)*** −1.5889 (0.233)***
Highly qualified (non-manual) −0.0975 (0.014)*** −0.6921 (0.146)*** −1.4195 (0.329)***
High skilled (manual) −0.1191 (0.015)*** −0.8424 (0.173)*** −1.7463 (0.398)***
Managers (non-manual) −0.0926 (0.014)*** −0.6051 (0.123)*** −1.1986 (0.268)***
Burgenland −0.0182 (0.012) −0.0573 (0.076) −0.0989 (0.147)
Northern Austria −0.0484 (0.009)*** −0.3170 (0.060)*** −0.6265 (0.117)***
Southern Austria −0.0353 (0.010)*** −0.2054 (0.060)*** −0.3875 (0.116)***
Western Austria −0.0582 (0.009)*** −0.3969 (0.055)*** −0.8061 (0.107)***
Single parent 0.0183 (0.009)* 0.1158 (0.056)* 0.2209 (0.109)*
Married −0.0270 (0.005)*** −0.2474 (0.042)*** −0.4939 (0.084)***
Owning an apartment −0.0259 (0.007)*** −0.2221 (0.072)** −0.4652 (0.153)**
Owning a house −0.0212 (0.005)*** −0.1767 (0.041)*** −0.3843 (0.084)***
Second −0.0252 (0.006)*** −0.1990 (0.048)*** −0.4154 (0.095)***
Third −0.0297 (0.006)*** −0.2372 (0.048)*** −0.4808 (0.095)***
Fourth −0.0197 (0.006)** −0.1437 (0.047)** −0.2933 (0.092)**
Constant 0.2476 (0.017)*** −0.4810 (0.104)*** −0.6302 (0.205)**
Table B.6 presents detailed estimation results for the linear probability, the probit and logit model when using the LUK sample.
Marginal effects of the probit and logit estimates are presented in Table B.8.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, standard errors in parantheses
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Table B.7: Estimation results national concept
Dependent variable: unemployed
Number of observations: 13,687
Variable LPM Probit Logit
Female 0.0046 (0.005) 0.0779 (0.043) 0.1317 (0.087)
15-19 −0.0413 (0.017)* −0.2836 (0.120)* −0.5798 (0.250)*
20-24 0.0082 (0.009) 0.0691 (0.073) 0.1514 (0.146)
25-29 0.0051 (0.009) 0.0697 (0.073) 0.1419 (0.147)
30-34 0.0059 (0.008) 0.0499 (0.070) 0.1093 (0.141)
35-39 0.0014 (0.007) 0.0251 (0.066) 0.0239 (0.137)
45-49 0.0003 (0.007) 0.0140 (0.070) 0.0177 (0.143)
50-54 0.0066 (0.008) 0.0571 (0.076) 0.1242 (0.155)
55-69 0.0416 (0.011)*** 0.3331 (0.077)*** 0.6618 (0.153)***
Not born in Austria 0.0118 (0.008) 0.1014 (0.051)* 0.1563 (0.100)
Apprenticeship −0.0346 (0.008)*** −0.1989 (0.050)*** −0.3906 (0.098)***
BMS −0.0298 (0.009)** −0.1834 (0.068)** −0.3395 (0.137)*
AHS −0.0492 (0.011)*** −0.3213 (0.103)** −0.6731 (0.215)**
BHS5 −0.0446 (0.010)*** −0.3158 (0.089)*** −0.6527 (0.192)***
BHS3 −0.0317 (0.021) −0.1544 (0.212) −0.2585 (0.439)
HLA −0.0351 (0.016)* −0.2174 (0.209) −0.5046 (0.474)
University −0.0413 (0.011)*** −0.2459 (0.108)* −0.5472 (0.234)*
White collar worker −0.0149 (0.007)* −0.1220 (0.055)* −0.2434 (0.112)*
Food, beverages and tobacco 0.0143 (0.015) 0.1436 (0.116) 0.2652 (0.234)
Textiles and leather 0.0138 (0.020) 0.1332 (0.149) 0.2581 (0.296)
Wood, paper, furniture 0.0140 (0.011) 0.1506 (0.097) 0.2723 (0.200)
Coke, petroleum, chemicals, plastics −0.0178 (0.014) −0.1466 (0.148) −0.3390 (0.315)
Metal, machinery −0.0059 (0.008) −0.0454 (0.081) −0.1391 (0.171)
Construction 0.0473 (0.010)*** 0.3536 (0.077)*** 0.6957 (0.156)***69
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Table B.7: continued
Dependent variable: unemployed
Number of observations: 13,687
Variable LPM Probit Logit
Repair of cars/motorcycles 0.0062 (0.013) 0.0595 (0.126) 0.0833 (0.262)
Wholesale 0.0075 (0.010) 0.0905 (0.103) 0.1257 (0.217)
Retail trade 0.0234 (0.009)** 0.2091 (0.078)** 0.3951 (0.160)*
Hotels and restaurants 0.0690 (0.012)*** 0.4444 (0.078)*** 0.8261 (0.155)***
Transport, storage, communication 0.0071 (0.010) 0.0830 (0.093) 0.1602 (0.192)
Financial intermediation −0.0076 (0.009) −0.1297 (0.133) −0.3991 (0.310)
Real estate, renting, business activities 0.0107 (0.010) 0.1327 (0.085) 0.2125 (0.174)
Health and social work −0.0213 (0.007)** −0.2867 (0.101)** −0.6658 (0.224)**
Apprenticeship contract −0.0919 (0.021)*** −0.4865 (0.130)*** −0.9135 (0.270)***
Low skilled (manual) −0.0681 (0.012)*** −0.3116 (0.057)*** −0.5850 (0.107)***
Medium skilled (manual) −0.0831 (0.013)*** −0.4269 (0.067)*** −0.8219 (0.130)***
Medium skilled (non-manual) −0.0855 (0.013)*** −0.4629 (0.077)*** −0.9103 (0.154)***
High skilled −0.1019 (0.013)*** −0.7205 (0.108)*** −1.4870 (0.234)***
Highly qualified (non-manual) −0.0982 (0.015)*** −0.7145 (0.154)*** −1.4868 (0.355)***
High skilled (manual) −0.1117 (0.016)*** −0.7313 (0.166)*** −1.5342 (0.377)***
Managers (non-manual) −0.1013 (0.014)*** −0.7927 (0.141)*** −1.6582 (0.326)***
Burgenland −0.0194 (0.012) −0.0743 (0.080) −0.1387 (0.156)
Northern Austria −0.0485 (0.009)*** −0.3320 (0.063)*** −0.6731 (0.125)***
Southern Austria −0.0295 (0.010)** −0.1713 (0.062)** −0.3214 (0.121)**
Western Austria −0.0529 (0.009)*** −0.3697 (0.058)*** −0.7421 (0.112)***
Single parent 0.0160 (0.009) 0.0969 (0.059) 0.1744 (0.115)
Married −0.0235 (0.005)*** −0.2249 (0.044)*** −0.4426 (0.088)***
Owning an apartment −0.0156 (0.007)* −0.1125 (0.071) −0.2386 (0.149)
Owning a house −0.0190 (0.005)*** −0.1628 (0.043)*** −0.3603 (0.088)***
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Table B.7: continued
Dependent variable: unemployed
Number of observations: 13,687
Variable LPM Probit Logit
Second −0.0224 (0.006)*** −0.1817 (0.049)*** −0.3716 (0.099)***
Third −0.0307 (0.006)*** −0.2423 (0.050)*** −0.5043 (0.100)***
Fourth −0.0197 (0.006)** −0.1470 (0.048)** −0.2964 (0.097)**
Constant 0.2394 (0.018)*** −0.5563 (0.108)*** −0.7435 (0.215)***
Table B.7 presents detailed estimation results for the linear probability, the probit and logit model when using the PES sample.
Marginal effects of the probit and logit estimates are presented in Table B.8.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, standard errors in parantheses
Table B.8: Marginal effects for probit and logit
Dependent variable: unemployed LFC LUK PES
Variable Probit Logit Probit Logit Probit Logit
Female 0.0031 0.0017 −0.0030 −0.0039 0.0079 0.0059
15-19 −0.0202 −0.0180 −0.0240 −0.0208 −0.0232 −0.0205
20-24 0.0060 0.0056 0.0067 0.0068 0.0073 0.0071
25-29 0.0100 0.0097 −0.0002 0.0005 0.0073 0.0066
30-34 0.0044 0.0041 −0.0019 −0.0007 0.0052 0.0050
35-39 −0.0002 −0.0007 −0.0041 −0.0040 0.0026 0.0011
45-49 −0.0035 −0.0030 0.0013 0.0012 0.0014 0.0008
50-54 −0.0127 −0.0110 0.0062 0.0062 0.0060 0.0057
55-69 −0.0040 −0.0035 0.0569 0.0534 0.0423 0.0382
Not born in Austria 0.0165 0.0126 0.0192 0.0147 0.0108 0.0072
Apprenticeship −0.0159 −0.0143 −0.0171 −0.0147 −0.0197 −0.017071
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Table B.8: continued
Dependent variable: unemployed LFC LUK PES
Variable Probit Logit Probit Logit Probit Logit
BMS −0.0147 −0.0125 −0.0141 −0.0111 −0.0165 −0.0134
AHS −0.0178 −0.0158 −0.0203 −0.0174 −0.0253 −0.0228
BHS5 −0.0176 −0.0159 −0.0191 −0.0169 −0.0256 −0.0228
BHS3 −0.0228 −0.0209 −0.0163 −0.0118 −0.0137 −0.0102
HLA −0.0100 −0.0087 −0.0278 −0.0263 −0.0183 −0.0179
University −0.0123 −0.0107 −0.0194 −0.0181 −0.0207 −0.0196
White collar worker −0.0046 −0.0042 −0.0130 −0.0116 −0.0125 −0.0110
Food, beverages and tobacco 0.0318 0.0288 0.0177 0.0161 0.0161 0.0131
Textiles and leather 0.0305 0.0260 0.0242 0.0219 0.0149 0.0128
Wood, paper, furniture 0.0190 0.0162 0.0197 0.0180 0.0169 0.0134
Coke, petroleum, chemicals, plastics 0.0087 0.0064 0.0004 −0.0005 −0.0131 −0.0129
Metal, machinery 0.0061 0.0047 −0.0057 −0.0055 −0.0044 −0.0059
Construction 0.0259 0.0244 0.0372 0.0340 0.0444 0.0395
Repair of cars/motorcycles 0.0100 0.0087 −0.0068 −0.0062 0.0063 0.0038
Wholesale 0.0129 0.0101 0.0022 0.0004 0.0097 0.0058
Retail trade 0.0253 0.0232 0.0238 0.0203 0.0241 0.0201
Hotels and restaurants 0.0441 0.0399 0.0499 0.0441 0.0606 0.0507
Transport, storage, communication 0.0082 0.0073 −0.0005 −0.0003 0.0089 0.0075
Financial intermediation 0.0142 0.0106 −0.0109 −0.0126 −0.0118 −0.0150
Real estate, renting, business activities 0.0179 0.0150 0.0204 0.0162 0.0146 0.0102
Health and social work −0.0085 −0.0083 −0.0181 −0.0170 −0.0236 −0.0231
Apprenticeship contract −0.0134 −0.0105 −0.0286 −0.0239 −0.0340 −0.0284
Low skilled (manual) −0.0213 −0.0178 −0.0280 −0.0231 −0.0270 −0.0223
Medium skilled (manual) −0.0265 −0.0228 −0.0343 −0.0291 −0.0350 −0.0296
Medium skilled (non-manual) −0.0273 −0.0234 −0.0396 −0.0345 −0.0386 −0.0333
72
Table B.8: continued
Dependent variable: unemployed LFC LUK PES
Variable Probit Logit Probit Logit Probit Logit
High skilled −0.0311 −0.0283 −0.0483 −0.0434 −0.0453 −0.0404
Highly qualified (non-manual) −0.0309 −0.0283 −0.0424 −0.0378 −0.0418 −0.0374
High skilled (manual) −0.0297 −0.0271 −0.0451 −0.0406 −0.0412 −0.0370
Managers (non-manual) −0.0255 −0.0228 −0.0399 −0.0349 −0.0447 −0.0402
Burgenland 0.0047 0.0038 −0.0057 −0.0044 −0.0071 −0.0058
Northern Austria −0.0204 −0.0182 −0.0287 −0.0250 −0.0290 −0.0257
Southern Austria −0.0180 −0.0155 −0.0193 −0.0161 −0.0159 −0.0131
Western Austria −0.0257 −0.0232 −0.0374 −0.0336 −0.0342 −0.0301
Single parent 0.0179 0.0154 0.0129 0.0110 0.0104 0.0082
Married −0.0148 −0.0135 −0.0258 −0.0229 −0.0228 −0.0197
Owning an apartment −0.0147 −0.0138 −0.0197 −0.0180 −0.0105 −0.0096
Owning a house −0.0147 −0.0143 −0.0183 −0.0177 −0.0165 −0.0161
Second −0.0017 −0.0019 −0.0189 −0.0173 −0.0169 −0.0151
Third −0.0070 −0.0061 −0.0223 −0.0199 −0.0221 −0.0200
Fourth −0.0039 −0.0037 −0.0140 −0.0126 −0.0139 −0.0123
Table B.8 presents marginal effects of the probit and logit estimates in Table B.5-B.7.
Table B.9: Estimation results for the linear probability model of the male samples
Dependent variable: unemployed
Variable LFC LUK PES
15-19 −0.0156 (0.025) −0.0198 (0.029) −0.0268 (0.026)
20-24 0.0129 (0.011) 0.0037 (0.013) −0.0028 (0.012)
25-29 0.0020 (0.010) −0.0103 (0.011) −0.0155 (0.011)73
B
Tables
Table B.9: continued
Dependent variable: unemployed
Variable LPM LUK PES
30-34 0.0052 (0.009) 0.0071 (0.010) 0.0071 (0.010)
35-39 −0.0035 (0.008) −0.0086 (0.009) −0.0101 (0.009)
45-49 0.0034 (0.008) 0.0100 (0.010) 0.0058 (0.010)
50-54 −0.0092 (0.009) 0.0147 (0.011) 0.0014 (0.011)
55-69 0.0049 (0.010) 0.0608 (0.014)*** 0.0377 (0.013)**
Not born in Austria 0.0102 (0.009) 0.0146 (0.011) 0.0086 (0.010)
Apprenticeship −0.0309 (0.011)** −0.0387 (0.012)** −0.0422 (0.012)***
BMS −0.0181 (0.013) −0.0288 (0.015) −0.0393 (0.014)**
AHS −0.0248 (0.017) −0.0412 (0.019)* −0.0473 (0.018)**
BHS5 −0.0325 (0.013)* −0.0423 (0.015)** −0.0511 (0.014)***
BHS3 −0.0328 (0.024) −0.0362 (0.028) −0.0324 (0.028)
HLA −0.0420 (0.020)* −0.0451 (0.026) −0.0622 (0.021)**
University −0.0383 (0.013)** −0.0506 (0.015)*** −0.0534 (0.014)***
White collar worker −0.0011 (0.008) −0.0091 (0.009) −0.0092 (0.008)
Food, beverages and tobacco 0.0337 (0.018) 0.0212 (0.020) 0.0012 (0.018)
Textiles and leather −0.0136 (0.020) −0.0058 (0.029) −0.0251 (0.023)
Wood, paper, furniture 0.0098 (0.011) 0.0108 (0.014) 0.0031 (0.013)
Coke, petroleum, chemicals, plastics −0.0118 (0.013) −0.0172 (0.017) −0.0338 (0.014)*
Metal, machinery 0.0024 (0.008) −0.0086 (0.010) −0.0099 (0.010)
Construction 0.0265 (0.009)** 0.0442 (0.012)*** 0.0481 (0.012)***
Repair of cars/motorcycles 0.0107 (0.013) −0.0013 (0.015) 0.0100 (0.016)
Wholesale 0.0092 (0.011) −0.0042 (0.013) 0.0036 (0.013)
Retail trade 0.0176 (0.013) 0.0208 (0.016) 0.0152 (0.015)
Hotels and restaurants 0.0480 (0.018)** 0.0521 (0.020)* 0.0518 (0.020)*
Transport, storage, communication 0.0038 (0.010) −0.0057 (0.013) −0.0035 (0.012)
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Table B.9: continued
Dependent variable: unemployed
Variable LPM LUK PES
Financial intermediation 0.0176 (0.013) 0.0005 (0.014) 0.0037 (0.013)
Real estate, renting, business activities 0.0236 (0.012) 0.0159 (0.014) 0.0087 (0.013)
Health and social work −0.0033 (0.011) −0.0168 (0.014) −0.0207 (0.012)
Apprenticeship contract −0.0940 (0.031)** −0.1593 (0.035)*** −0.1660 (0.032)***
Low skilled (manual) −0.0744 (0.017)*** −0.1079 (0.020)*** −0.0926 (0.019)***
Medium skilled (manual) −0.0877 (0.017)*** −0.1244 (0.020)*** −0.1181 (0.019)***
Medium skilled (non-manual) −0.0845 (0.019)*** −0.1286 (0.021)*** −0.1206 (0.021)***
High skilled −0.0987 (0.019)*** −0.1489 (0.021)*** −0.1340 (0.021)***
Highly qualified (non-manual) −0.0965 (0.020)*** −0.1429 (0.023)*** −0.1303 (0.022)***
High skilled (manual) −0.0957 (0.019)*** −0.1563 (0.021)*** −0.1412 (0.021)***
Managers (non-manual) −0.0914 (0.019)*** −0.1398 (0.022)*** −0.1372 (0.020)***
Burgenland −0.0193 (0.015) −0.0284 (0.018) −0.0230 (0.017)
Northern Austria −0.0556 (0.012)*** −0.0740 (0.014)*** −0.0600 (0.013)***
Southern Austria −0.0490 (0.012)*** −0.0539 (0.014)*** −0.0428 (0.014)**
Western Austria −0.0591 (0.012)*** −0.0794 (0.013)*** −0.0645 (0.013)***
Single parent 0.0292 (0.013)* 0.0374 (0.014)** 0.0293 (0.014)*
Married −0.0175 (0.006)** −0.0344 (0.007)*** −0.0316 (0.007)***
Owning an apartment −0.0244 (0.008)** −0.0322 (0.009)*** −0.0169 (0.010)
Owning a house −0.0228 (0.006)*** −0.0307 (0.007)*** −0.0214 (0.007)**
Second −0.0102 (0.007) −0.0389 (0.008)*** −0.0401 (0.008)***
Third −0.0146 (0.007)* −0.0396 (0.008)*** −0.0460 (0.008)***
Fourth −0.0148 (0.007)* −0.0314 (0.008)*** −0.0394 (0.008)***
Constant 0.2146 (0.024)*** 0.3304 (0.027)*** 0.3120 (0.026)***
Number of observations 7,727 7,836 7,749
Table B.9 presents the results of estimating a linear probability model for each of the concepts male sample.75
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Table B.9: continued
Dependent variable: unemployed
Variable LPM LUK PES
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, standard errors in parantheses
Table B.10: Estimation results for the linear probability model of the male samples
Dependent variable: unemployed
Variable LFC LUK PES
15-19 −0.0549 (0.016)*** −0.0668 (0.019)*** −0.0582 (0.021)**
20-24 0.0029 (0.012) 0.0091 (0.013) 0.0174 (0.014)
25-29 0.0216 (0.012) 0.0003 (0.012) 0.0272 (0.014)
30-34 0.0044 (0.011) −0.0139 (0.011) 0.0007 (0.012)
35-39 0.0021 (0.010) −0.0013 (0.011) 0.0146 (0.011)
45-49 −0.0113 (0.010) −0.0091 (0.011) −0.0057 (0.011)
50-54 −0.0174 (0.010) −0.0008 (0.013) 0.0130 (0.013)
55-69 −0.0203 (0.012) 0.0557 (0.019)** 0.0469 (0.019)*
Not born in Austria 0.0268 (0.011)* 0.0264 (0.011)* 0.0118 (0.012)
Apprenticeship −0.0213 (0.010)* −0.0190 (0.011) −0.0276 (0.012)*
BMS −0.0280 (0.010)** −0.0206 (0.011) −0.0248 (0.013)
AHS −0.0411 (0.012)** −0.0336 (0.014)* −0.0502 (0.015)***
BHS5 −0.0325 (0.012)** −0.0265 (0.013)* −0.0394 (0.015)**
BHS3 −0.0534 (0.019)** −0.0252 (0.028) −0.0326 (0.032)
HLA −0.0161 (0.020) −0.0361 (0.017)* −0.0231 (0.023)
University −0.0135 (0.016) −0.0204 (0.016) −0.0278 (0.018)
White collar worker −0.0150 (0.010) −0.0309 (0.011)** −0.0288 (0.012)*
Food, beverages and tobacco 0.0239 (0.021) 0.0112 (0.022) 0.0321 (0.025)
Textiles and leather 0.0427 (0.026) 0.0380 (0.027) 0.0396 (0.030)
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Table B.10: continued
Dependent variable: unemployed
Variable LPM LUK PES
Wood, paper, furniture 0.0339 (0.020) 0.0437 (0.023) 0.0454 (0.024)
Coke, petroleum, chemicals, plastics 0.0475 (0.032) 0.0285 (0.032) 0.0159 (0.032)
Metal, machinery 0.0167 (0.013) 0.0058 (0.014) 0.0075 (0.015)
Construction 0.0153 (0.016) 0.0232 (0.019) 0.0127 (0.020)
Repair of cars/motorcycles 0.0023 (0.023) −0.0224 (0.023) −0.0134 (0.027)
Wholesale 0.0086 (0.013) 0.0077 (0.015) 0.0078 (0.016)
Retail trade 0.0228 (0.009)* 0.0219 (0.011)* 0.0269 (0.011)*
Hotels and restaurants 0.0430 (0.013)*** 0.0551 (0.014)*** 0.0778 (0.016)***
Transport, storage, communication 0.0071 (0.014) 0.0036 (0.015) 0.0218 (0.018)
Financial intermediation 0.0041 (0.011) −0.0127 (0.011) −0.0192 (0.011)
Real estate, renting, business activities 0.0062 (0.011) 0.0192 (0.013) 0.0153 (0.014)
Health and social work −0.0061 (0.008) −0.0121 (0.009) −0.0180 (0.010)
Apprenticeship contract 0.0135 (0.024) 0.0020 (0.027) −0.0092 (0.029)
Low skilled (manual) −0.0344 (0.013)** −0.0406 (0.014)** −0.0503 (0.016)**
Medium skilled (manual) −0.0266 (0.015) −0.0312 (0.017) −0.0362 (0.019)
Medium skilled (non-manual) −0.0337 (0.013)** −0.0471 (0.015)** −0.0508 (0.017)**
High skilled −0.0448 (0.014)** −0.0681 (0.015)*** −0.0729 (0.018)***
Highly qualified (non-manual) −0.0550 (0.017)** −0.0614 (0.019)** −0.0723 (0.020)***
High skilled (manual) −0.0585 (0.040) −0.0880 (0.037)* −0.0820 (0.049)
Managers (non-manual) −0.0176 (0.021) −0.0361 (0.023) −0.0581 (0.022)**
Burgenland 0.0110 (0.015) −0.0084 (0.016) −0.0163 (0.017)
Northern Austria −0.0172 (0.011) −0.0218 (0.013) −0.0359 (0.014)**
Southern Austria −0.0180 (0.011) −0.0182 (0.013) −0.0151 (0.014)
Western Austria −0.0248 (0.011)* −0.0360 (0.012)** −0.0397 (0.013)**
Single parent 0.0268 (0.011)* 0.0106 (0.011) 0.0116 (0.012)77
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Table B.10: continued
Dependent variable: unemployed
Variable LPM LUK PES
Married −0.0088 (0.007) −0.0182 (0.008)* −0.0120 (0.009)
Owning an apartment −0.0144 (0.009) −0.0187 (0.010) −0.0128 (0.011)
Owning a house −0.0084 (0.007) −0.0104 (0.007) −0.0159 (0.008)
Second 0.0068 (0.008) −0.0083 (0.009) 0.0014 (0.009)
Third −0.0018 (0.007) −0.0185 (0.008)* −0.0110 (0.009)
Fourth 0.0045 (0.008) −0.0062 (0.009) 0.0060 (0.010)
Constant 0.1172 (0.018)*** 0.1747 (0.021)*** 0.1758 (0.022)***
Number of observations 6,669 6,686 5,938
Table B.9 presents the results of estimating a linear probability model for each of the concepts female sample.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, standard errors in parantheses
78
C Construction of the PES conform
sample
Note that the following is a non commented Stata code. All commands are very intuitive
and thus clear, for the meaning of the variables see the codebook which is available at
http://www.statistik.at .
*Generate variable unemployed
gen unemp=.
*recode PES benefits
recode hamsl (100000=1) (200000=2) (300000=3) (600000=4)
**drop economically inactive
drop if jlwi==1
drop if jlwi==2
drop if hnagrund==1
drop if bpras==1
drop if hamsl==3
drop if hamsl==130000
drop if hamsl==230000
drop if hamsl==500000
drop if carw==2 & chearw==2 & hams==2 & hamsl==0
drop if carw==2 & chearw==2 & hams==2 & hamsl==4
drop if carw==2 & cgrund==12 & hams==2 & hamsl==0
drop if carw==2 & chearw==2 & lgru==4
drop if cgrund==2
drop if cgrund==5
drop if chearw==3
drop if dweni==10
drop if cgrund==6 & hams==2 & unemp==.
drop if carw==2 & chearw==1 & cdau==1 & cfort==2 & hams==2 & unemp==.
drop if cgrund==15 & unemp==.
drop if dweni==15 & unemp==.
79
C Construction of the PES conform sample
drop if dweni==16 & unemp==.
drop if xdstd6==0 & unemp==.
**detecting employed
replace unemp=0 if hamsl==400000
replace unemp=0 if cgrund==11
replace unemp=0 if carw==2 & chearw==1 & cgrund==1 & unemp==.
replace unemp=0 if carw==2 & chearw==1 & cgrund==3 & unemp==.
replace unemp=0 if carw==2 & chearw==1 & cgrund==10 & unemp==.
replace unemp=0 if carw==2 & chearw==1 & dweni==1 & unemp==.
replace unemp=0 if carw==2 & chearw==1 & dweni==2 & unemp==.
replace unemp=0 if carw==2 & chearw==1 & dweni==3 & unemp==.
replace unemp=0 if carw==2 & chearw==1 & dweni==4 & unemp==.
replace unemp=0 if carw==2 & chearw==1 & dweni==13 & unemp==.
replace unemp=0 if cgrund==1 & unemp==.
replace unemp=0 if carw==1 & cherw==2 & estund>=0 & cgrund==3 & unemp==.
replace unemp=0 if carw==1 & cherw==2 & estund>=0 & dweni==3 & unemp==.
replace unemp=0 if cgrund==3 & unemp==.
replace unemp=0 if carw==1 & cherw==1 & unemp==. & hams==2 & hamsl==0
replace unemp=0 if carw==1 & cherw==1 & unemp==. & hamsl==4 & hams==2
replace unemp=0 if carw==1 & xdstd==2 & unemp==.
replace unemp=0 if carw==1 & xdstd6>=2 & xdstd6<=5 & unemp==.
replace unemp=0 if carw==1 & cherw==1 & dstd>=20 & unemp==.
replace unemp=0 if cfort==1 & unemp==.
replace unemp=0 if cgrund==8 & unemp==.
replace unemp=0 if cgrund==7 & unemp==.
replace unemp=0 if carw==2 & chearw==1 & cdau==2 & cgrund==4 & hams==2 &
& hamsl==0 & unemp==.
**detecting unemployed
replace unemp=1 if hamsl==1
replace unemp=1 if hamsl==2
replace unemp=1 if carw==2 & csich==2 & chearw==2 & hams==1
replace unemp=1 if carw==2 & chearw==1 & dweni==12 & unemp==.
replace unemp=1 if cgrund==6 & hams==1 & unemp==.
*using information fromlgru
drop if lgru==3 & unemp==.
drop if lgru==8 & unemp==.
*else
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drop if carw==2 & csich==2 & hams==2 & unemp==.
drop if carw==2 & chearw==1 & cdau==1 & cfort==2 & hams==2 & unemp==.
drop if unemp==1 & xdstd6==0 & estund==-3
gen estund2=estund
replace estund2=0 if estund==-3
gen tmp=dstd+estund2
drop if unemp==0 & tmp<12
drop tmp estund2
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Abstract
This study questions whether men and women have different probabilities of being
unemployed in Austria. Three definitions of unemployment are used in Austria: the
labor force concept from the International Labor Organization, the subsistence concept
and a national definition. Each concept is applied to estimate the effect of being female
on the unemployment probability using four subsamples of the Austrian Labor Force
Survey of 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007. The female sample unemployment rate exceeds
the male one in the labor force and the national concept by about 14-16 percent. But
no significant effects of being female can be found, after taking personal, household and
job characteristics into account. This holds independently of using a linear probability,
a probit or a logit model. The main reason for this is the equalizing effect of industries
and professional positions. The decomposition of the raw risk-differential into a part
attributable to differences in endowments and a second, unexplained part shows that
about 16.5 percent of the raw differential in the labor force concept and 55.9 percent in
the national concept are unexplainable by endowments. When applying the subsistence
concept, women are better off than men. Men have a higher sample unemployment
rate. If men had the same characteristics as women, the male unemployment probability
would even be higher. The analysis points out that the impact of being female depends
on the applied concept. There seems to be a tendency that women face a higher risk
of being unemployed due to discrimination or some unexplained differences between
men and women, when applying the labor force concept and the national concept. In
contrast, using the subsistence concept this tendency reversed.
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Zusammenfassung
Diese Arbeit untersucht, ob Frauen in Österreich mit höherer Wahrscheinlichkeit ar-
beitslos sind als Männer. In Österreich gibt es drei Definitionen von Arbeitslosigkeit:
das labor force Konzept, das Lebensunterhaltskonzept und eine nationale Definition.
Alle drei Konzepte werden verwendet, um den Effekt des Frauseins auf die Arbeitslosig-
keitswahrscheinlichkeit zu schätzen. Hierfür werden Daten der österreichischen Arbeits-
kräfteerhebung aus den Jahren 2004, 2005, 2006 und 2007 verwendet. Unter Anwen-
dung des labor force Konzepts und der nationalen Definition liegt die Arbeitslosenrate
der Frauen 14-16 Prozent über jener der Männer. Unabhängig von den Konzepten und
der Schätzmethode - linear probability Modell, Probit und Logit Modell - können, nach
dem Kontrollieren für Personen-, Haushalts- und Berufscharakteristika, keine signifikan-
ten Effekte gefunden werden. Der Hauptgrund hierfür liegt im angleichenden Effekt von
Industrie und beruflicher Stellung. Die Zerlegung der Risikodifferenz in einen Teil be-
dingt durch Charakteristika und einen zweiten, unerklärten Teil zeigt, dass 16.5 Prozent
der Differenz im labor force Konzept und 55.9 Prozent gemäß nationaler Definition nicht
durch die Charakteristika erklärt werden können. Unter Verwendung des Lebensunter-
haltskonzeptes sind Frauen besser gestellt. Die Arbeitslosenrate im Sample ist höher
für Männer. Hätten Männer und Frauen dieselben Charakteristika, wäre das Arbeitslo-
sigkeitsrisiko von Männern noch höher. Die Untersuchung zeigt, dass die Unterschiede
zwischen Männern und Frauen abhängig vom verwendeten Konzept sind.
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